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PREFACE
is a result of many, many hours of
reading, studying and teaching. The editors have instructed
courses and workshops which required a theoretical explanation of
affective education. This text is our attempt to present some
representative and excellent articles in the areas of affective
education.

Exploring, Deciding and Acting

Many values clarification lessons are being published.
These may take the form of strategy books to elaborate kits.
As
materials proliferate, more and more teachers will gain access.
In one sense this overabundance of materials can serve a useful
purpose.
However, the editors are concerned that well-meaning
teachers and administrators may do as much harm as good unless
there is first some degree of comprehension of an approach to
values analysis and moral education.
It is the writers' contentions that moral education and
values clarification is not just another bandwagon. As educators
we have a responsibility to keep abreast of current curriculum
trends; today, we must know something about behavioral objectives,
gaming and simulation, interaction analysis, role playing, inquiry,
concepts, generalizations, and reflection. We should also know
something of the theoretical constructs of values clarification
and moral education.
We would maintain that moral education and values clarifi
cation are going to become much more important in all areas of
the curriculum. As such these concepts have existed for several
years.
Perhaps John Dewey's writings in the 1890's did much to
awaken the present generation to the need.
During the past sev
eral years such writers as Hunt and Metcalf, Jewett, Simon,
Kohlberg and Piaget, have contributed much to curriculum develop
ment.
It is our contention that moral education and values analy
sis ought to be of central concern to the curriculum. Values
education is the most important kind of education.
Nationwide we are witness to a growing trend of training
educators in the skills of moral education. Many education
method courses are beginning to deal with this complex issue.
Many special workshops are being offered. Thus a need exists to
provide a background for this new curriculum area. This book is
one such attempt at filling this vacuum.
R.G. Helms
Centerville, Ohio
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G. Strong
Kettering, Ohio
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VALUES EDUCATION
by
Gerald Strong
(Reprinted by permission from Affective Education,
1974, pp. 59-60.)

Values are a part of the larger trend in education more
commonly referred to as "humanistic," "affective," "confluent,"
or "psychological" education.
Humanistic education emphasized the non-academic aspects
of a student's growth and development.

The humanistic approach

to education aims chiefly at promoting positive self-concepts,
increasing achievement motivation, promoting creative thinking
and behavior, fostering better human relations and clarifying
values.
Our values are of utmost importance.

It is our values that

determine the choices we make and the direction we take in life.
In our highly complexed, individualized society, we are
constantly bombarded by numerous decisions.

Today people are

confronted with more choices than ever before.

In Future Shock

Alvin Toffler warns that future generations may be faced with the
dilemma of overchoice.

A person who has no value system or a

confused value system may not be able to cope with the dilemma of
overchoice.

Therefore, it appears imperative that each individual

be assisted in establishing a set of values by which he can make
rational decisions in unfamiliar situations.
We may feel that we have a well defined set of values, only
to realize that when we are faced with a novel situation or a
forced choice between two or more agreeable or disagreeable alter
natives that we become thoroughly confused.
The concept of values education is not new.
1

There have

always been parents and educators who have searched for ways to
assist the youth in constructing a system of values.
proaches may be used in constructing values.

Numerous ap

In their attempt

de

at

Tr

to assist the younger generation in developing values, parents

av.

and educators have traditionally used such approaches as modeling,

Va

moralizing, laissez-faire

and values clarification.

The adults who use the modeling approach, at tempt to set a
living example for youth to follow.

This approach required the

adult to set examples in words and in actions as well as in dress
etc.

bu
wh

th

so

The difficulty with this approach is that our youth of to

day are exposed to so many different adults that it is difficult

va

for them to select an appropriate model.

pr

Moralizing

values.

is an indoctrinational approach to teaching

th

With the moralizing approach, the adults assume that

wh

they know the "right" set of values that everyone should have.

ha

The problem with this approach is that it has become ineffective.

er

In our pluralistic society, the youth of today are introduced to

pe
sh,

many different philosophies.

The youth become confused.

In the

final analysis, they are left alone to make their own decisions
about whose advice to follow or values to adopt.

ti<

The youth who

are reared by adults who use the moralizing approach in teaching
values are not equipped to make rational choices.

They have not

ac1

had the experiences of selecting what they think is best and re

sy:

frain from the "less desirable" values which others are en
couraging them to adopt.

pee

The laissez-faire approach to values education requires
everybody to refrain from teaching values.

The adults who adopt

da~

beJ

this approach feel that everyone must develop their own values
without any assistance.

They feel that everyone will be allright

in the end.

USE

The fallacy of the laissez-faire approach is that every
thing usually does not come out allright in the end.

Our youth

of

whe

of today do not need parents and teachers to run their lives, but

whi

they do need, and in most instances, want assistance in learning

and

how to make value judgments.

and

Values clarification is a process approach to helping people

2

rea

to
,us ap-

develop a s ystem of values .

The process of values clarification

1pt

This process allows a person to learn about himself, to hecome

its

aware of his beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and what it is he values.

e ling ,

Values clarification does not provide anyone with a set of values,

attempts to assist people in developing their own system of values.

but rather allows a person to discover his own values.

The adults

who use the process of values clarification are not concernedwith
the

the values a per s on holds, but rather the process by which a per

dress

son develops his value system.

: to

lcult

The questions that a person must ask to determine his own
values stem from the areas of prizing, choosing and acting.

By

prizing, a person selects the beliefs, behavior and attitudes
that he prizes and cherishes and is willing to publicl y affirm
when appropriate.

,e.

In the process of choosing, the person must

have a free choice to select from alternatives after the consid

::tive.

eration of the consequences of each alternative.

~d to

person must decide if he is to act the way he believes.

ri

the

ions
who

By acting, a
A

person

should form a pattern, be consistent and repetitious in his ac
tions.
If a person cannot select what he prizes, make a choice be

ching

tween alternatives with a knowledge of the consequences and take

e not

action on his beliefs with consistency, he does not have a value

d re-

system.
The goal of the process of values clarification is to assist
people in applying the above processes of valuing in their every
day lives; to assist people in applying these processes to the

adopt

beliefs and behavior patterns the y now hold and to those they are

ues

now developing.

lright

To achieve the goal of values clarification, educators must
use techniques which will aid the youth of toda y in becoming aware
of the beliefs the y prize and would be willing to affirm publicly

'OUth

when appropriate.

,s, but

which encourage students to consider the alternatives of thinking

1rning

and acting.

The educators mu s t use materials and techniques

The learners must be encouraged to consider the pros

and-cons and the consequences of the different alternatives in
reaching decision s .

The teacher aids the learned in discovering
3

whether their beliefs correspond with their actions.

If there is

a gross discrepancy between the learner's stated beliefs and ac
tions, the teacher attempts to assist the student in coordinating
the two.
Through simulation exercises, the teacher provides the
learners an opportunity to work their way through life-like situ
ations.

The learners are encouraged to use these processes in

everyday life.

People only learn what they are allowed to do.

An individual does not really understand a problem until he/she
has worked his/her way through it.

It is only when people are

allowed to make their own decisions and evaluate the consequences
of the alternatives that they develop their own system of values.

WHAT IS VALUING?
by
Nicholas Rescher
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum,
Spring/Summer 1972, p. 3.)

Man is a creature that not only does things but thinks about
what he does.

Accordingly, we do things for reasons-because we

regard them as leading to certain benefits for ourselves or
others.

Values represent the ultimate reasons people have for

acting as they do-their basic aims, objectives, aspirations,
ideals.

They cover the whole domain or rational human action and

range from our lowest to our most elevated concerns.

The little

things in life-the good manners and ordinary politeness of social
interaction-manifest values no less sharply than the big crises.
Values are intangibles in the final analysis, they are
things of the mind that have to do with the vision people have of
"the good life" for themselves and their fellows.

Each of aper

son's values-be it "loyalty'' or "economic justice" or "self
aggrandizement"-plays a role in his concept of human well-being
by providing a standard by which he assesses the extent of his
4

satisfactions in and with life.

Abstract in character, these

values manifest themselves concretely in the ways in which
people talk and act, and especially in the pattern of their ex
penditure of time and effort, in their actions at work and leisure
and in their choices in the marketplace.

It is primarily through

these concrete manifestations that values secure their importance
and relevance in human affairs.
Values have to do with the rationalization of behavior-its
justification and its explanation.

Precisely because these two

key factors of action and rationalizationcanget out of line, we
come to the problem of the hypocrite; the person who verbally sub
scribes to a value but violates it in action.

Since we tend to

prize authenticity in our fellows nothing "turns us off" faster
toward someone than this form of hypocrisy-talking a value up
without implementing it in action.
Values are worth bothering with because they make a differ
ence.

When we know someone's values we are able to grasp "what

makes him tick."
deal with him.

We are better able to understand him and to
The possession of diverse values set people apart

and shared values simplify their working together.
As biological organism all men share certain basic values
t

1

,f

relating to the maintenance of life, values enshrined in the
rules of all civilized societies.

But, of course, social and

personal variation makes for a wide divergence in human values.
Values can change.

When this happens-when changes in the

conditions of life are such as to cast from the pedestal of the
true and genuine some heretofore accepted value that once be
longed there, there lies before us a
''transvaluation" of values.

(Nietzche-reminiscent)

But, of course, to say this is not

to deny that it is unlikely to the point of inconceivability that
man y of our historic social or personal values-"justice," "in
telligence," and "kindness," to give just three examples-could
ever, under any realistically foreseeable circumstances, are
likely ever to be dethroned.
Why bother to clarify our values?

Knowing our own values

is a crucial part of learning about ourselves.
5

What sorts of

things are really meaningful to us?
and working towards?
come into being?

What are we striving for

What sort of a world do we want to see

To the extent that we cannot answer such ques

tions we have failed to come to terms with ourselves.

The mark

of an immature person lies exactly here, in that he still "has a
great deal to learn about himself."
The single most important fact about values is that they
themselves can be evaluated in turn.

There are good values and

bad values-curel or callous or self-aggrandizing values and
those that are cooperative or kindly or humane.
It is especially important to equip children with a "sense
of values."

They must not only have values (that is pretty well

inevitable) but should have an intelligent attitude towards
them.

Not only should they be taught good values, but they

should learn to be critically aware of their own values and of
the need to keep their actual life-style properly attuned to
them.
The big values in our lives are called ideals .
tance of having them cannot be exaggerated.
of vision and aspiration in our lives.

The impor

They are the basis

As the popular song put

it, if you don'e have a dream you can't make a dream come true.
In the kingdom of nature, man alone has a capacity for spiritual
growth-for becoming bigger than life-size.

All significant hu

man achievement, great and small, is the product of intelligence
guided by the vision of an ideal.
Whether we choose to confront it or not, all of us face the
basic question:
reflecting about.

What really are my values?

It is well worth

For it is close to impossible to come away

from such reflection without an enhanced understanding of our
selves and our relationship with our fellows.

6

TOWARD
A MODERN APPROACH TO VALUES:
THE VALUING PROCESS IN
THE MATURE PERSON
by
Carl R. Rogers
(Reprinted by permission from Paul Kurtz, ed.,

Mor al PI'obZems in Contemporary Society,
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1969, pp. 77-95.)

There is a great deal of concern today with the problems
of values.

Youth, in almost every country, is deeply uncertain

of its value orientation; the values associated with various re
ligions have lost much of their influence; sophisticated indi
viduals in ever y culture seem unsure and troubled as to the
goals they hold in esteem.

The reasons are not far to seek.

The world culture, in all its aspects, seems increasingly sci
entific and relativistic, and the rigid, absolute views onvalues
which come to us from the past appe ar anachronistic.

Evenmore

important, perhaps, is the fact that the modern individual is
assailed from every angle by diverg e nt and contradictory value
claims.

It is no longer possible, as it was in the not too dis

tant historical past, to settle comfortably into the value sys
tem of one's community and live out one's life without ever ex
amining the nature and the assumptions of that system.
In this situation it is not surprising that value orien
tations from the past appear to be in a state of disintegration
or collapse.

Men question whether there are, or can be, any

universal values.

It is often felt that we may have lost, in

our modern world, all possibilit y of an y general or cross-cul
tural basis for values.

One natural result of this uncertainty

and confusion is that there is an increasing concern about, in
terest in, and a searching for a sound or meaningful value ap
proach which can hold its own in toda y 's world.
I share this general concern.

I have also experienced the

mor e specific value issues which arise in my own field, psycho
therapy.

The client's feelings and convictions about values
7

f requently change during therapy.

How can he or we knowwhether

they have changed in a sound direction?

Or does he simply, as

some claim, take over the value system of his therapist?

Is

psychotherapy simply a device whereby the unacknowledged and un
examined values of the therapist are unknowingly transmitted to
an unsuspecting client?

Or should this transmission of values

be the therapist's openly held purpose?

Should he become the mod

ern priest, upholding and imparting a value system suitable for
today?

And what would such a value system be?

There has been

much discussion of such issues, ranging from thoughtful and em
1
pirically based presentations such as that of Glad,
to more pol
emic statements.

As is so often true, the general problemfaced

by the culture is painfully and specifically evident in the cul
tural microcosm which is called the therapeutic relationship .
I should like to attempt a modest approach to this whole
problem.

I have observed changes in the approach to values as

the individual grows from infancy to adulthood.

I observe fur

ther changes when, if he is fortunate, he continues to grow to
ward true psychological maturity.

Many of these observations

grow out of my experience as a therapist, where I have had the
rich opportunity of seeing the ways in which individuals move to
ward a richer life.

From these observations I believe I see some

directional threads emerging which might offer a new concept of
the valuing process, more tenable in the modern world.

I have

made a beginning by presenting some of these ideas partially in
2
previous writings,
I would like now to voice them more clearly
and more fully.
I would stress that my vantage point for making these observations is not that of the scholar or philosopher:

I am

speaking from my experience of the functioning human being, as I
have lived with him in the intimate experience of therapy, and
in other situations of growth, change, and development.

To me

these seem to express some core human values which a humanistic
ethics can support with confidence.
Some Definitions
Before I present some of these observations, perhaps I
8

should try to clarify what I mean by values.

There are many defi

nitions which have been used, but I have found helpful some dis
tinctions made by Charles Morris.

He points out that value is a

term we employ in different ways.

We use it to refer to the ten

dency of any living beings to show preference, in their actions,
for one kin of object or objective rather than another.
preferential behavior he calls "operative values."
involve any cognitive or conceptual thinking.

This

It need not

It is simply the

value choice which is indicated behaviorally when the organism
selects one object, rejects another.
in a simple

Y

When the earthworm, placed

maze, chooses the smooth arm of the

Y

instead

of the path which is paved with sandpaper, he is indicating an
operative value.
A second use of the term might be called "conceived values."
This is the preference of the individual for a symbolized object.
Usually in such a preference there is anticipation or foresight
of the outcome of behavior directed toward such a symbolized ob
ject.

A choice such as "honesty is the best policy" is such a

conceived value.
A final use of the term might be called "objective value."
People use the word in this way when they wish to speak of what

ne

is objectively preferable, whether or not it is in fact sensed or
conceived of as desirable.
definition scarcely at all.

What I have to say involves this last
I will be concerned with operative

values and conceptualized values.
The Infant's Way of Valuing
Let me first speak about the infant.

The living human be

ing has, at the outset, a clear approach to values.
some things and experiences, and rejects others.
I

C

He prefers

We can infer

from studying his behavior that he prefers those experiences
which maintain, enhance, or actualize his organism, and rejects
those which do not serve this end.

Watch him for a bit:

Hunger is negatively valued. His expression of this
often come through loud and clear.
Food is positively valued.
But when he is satisfied, food
is negatively valued, and the same milk he responded to
so eagerly is now spit out, or the breast which seemed so
satisfying is now rejected as he turns his head away from
9

the nipple with an amusing facial expression of disgust
and revulsion.
He values security, and the holding and caressing which
seem to communicate security.
He values new experience for its own sake, and we observe
this in his obvious pleasure in discovering his toes, in
his searching movements, in his endless curiosity.
He shows a clear negative valuing of pain, bitter tastes,
sudden loud sounds.
All of this is commonplace, but let us look at these faces
in terms of what they tell us about the infant's approach to
values.

It is first of all a flexible, changing, valuing pro

cess, not a fixed system.
food.

He likes food and dislikes the same

He values security and rest, and rejects it for new ex

perience.

What is going on seems best described as an organis

mic valuing process, in which each element, each moment of what
he is experiencing is somehow weighed, and selected or rejected,
depending on whether, at that moment, it tends to actualize the
organism or not.

This complicated weighing of experience is

clearly an organismic, not a conscious or symbolic function.
These are operative, not conceived values.

But this process can

nonetheless deal with complex value problems.

I would remind you

of the experiment in which young infants had spread in front of
them a score or more of dishes of natural (that is, unflavored)
foods.

Over a period of time they clearly tended to value the

foods which enhanced their own survival, growth, and development.
If for a time a child gorged himself on starches, this would soon
be balanced by a protein "binge."

If at times he chose a diet

deficient in some vitamin, he would later seek out foods rich in
this very vitamin.

He was utilizing the wisdom of the body in

his value choices, or perhaps more accurately, the physiological
choices.
Another aspect of the infant's approach to value is that
the source or locus of the evaluating process is clearly within
himself.

Unlike many of us, he knows what he likes and dislikes,

and the origin of these value choices lies strictly within him
self.

He is the center of the valuing process, the evidence for
10

his choices being supplied by his own senses.

He is not at this

point influenced by what his parents think he should prefer, or
by what the church says, or by the opinion of the latest "expert"
in the field, or by the persuasive talents of an advertising firm.
It is from within his own experiencing that his organism is saying
in the nonverbal terms- "This is good for me,"
me,"

"I like this," "I strongly dislike that."

"That is bad for
He would laugh

at our concern over values, if he could understand it.

Howcould

anyone fail to know what he liked and disliked, what was good
for him and what was not?
The Change in the Valuing Process
What happens to this highly efficient, soundly based valuing
process?

By what sequence of events do we exchange it for the

more rigid, uncertain, inefficient approach to values which char
acterizes most of us as adults?

Let me try to state briefly one

of the major ways in which I think this happens.
The infant needs love, wants it, tends to behave in ways
which will bring a repetition of this wanted experience.
this brings complications.

But

He pulls baby sister's hair, and

finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests.

He then

hears that hs is "a naughty, bad boy," and this may be reinforced
by a slap on the hand.

He is cut off from affection.

As this

experience is repeated, and many, many others like it, he grad
ually learns that what "feels good" is often "bad" in the eyes
of others.

Then the next step occurs, in which he comes to take

the same attitude toward himself which these others have taken.
Now, as he pulls his sister's hair, he solemnly intones, "Bad,
bad boy."

He is introjecting the value judgment of another,

taking it in as his own.

To that degree he loses touch with his

own organismic valuing process.

He has deserted the wisdom of

his organism, giving up the locus of evaluation, and is trying
to behave in terms of values set by another, in order to hold
love.
Or take another example at an older level.

A boy senses,

though perhaps not consciously, that he is more loved and prized
by his parents when he thinks of being a doctor than when he
11

thinks of being an artist.

Gradually he introjects the values

attached to being a doctor.
a doctor.

He comes to want , above all, to be

Then in college he is baffled by the fact that he re

peatedly fails in chemistry, which is absolutely necessary to
become a physician, in spite of the fact that the guidance coun
selor assures him he has the ability to pass the course.

Only

in counseling interviews does he begin to realize how completely
he has lost touch with his organismic reactions, how out of
touch he is with his own valuing process.
Let me give another instance from a class of mine, a group
of prospective teachers.

I asked them at the beginning of the

course, "Please list for me the two or three values which you
would most wish to pass on to the children with whom you will
work."

They turned in many value goals, but I was surprised by

some of the items.

Several listed such things as "to speak

correctly," "to use good English, not to use words like ain't . "
Others mentioned neatnese--"to do things according to instruc
tions"; one explained her hope that "When I tell them to write
their names in the upper right-hand corner with the date under
it, I want them to do it that way, not in some other form".
I confess I was somewhat appalled that for some of these
girls the most important values to be passed on to pupils were
to avoid bad grammar, or meticulously to follow teacher's in
structions.

I felt baffled.

Certainly these behaviors had not

been experienced as the most satisfying and meaningful elements
in their own lives.

The listing of such values could only be

accounted for by the fact that these behaviors had gained~
proval-and thus had been introjected as deeply important.
Perhaps these several illustrations will indicate that in
an attempt to gain or hold love, approval, esteem, the indi
vidual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which was his in in
fancy, and places it in others.

He learns to have a basic dis

trust for his own experiencing as a guide to his behavior.

He

learns from others a large number of conceived values, and adopts
them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant from
what he is experiencing.

Because these concepts are not based
12

on his own valuing, they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather
than fluid and changing.
Some Introjected Patterns
It is in this fashion, I believe, that most of us accumulate the introjected value patterns by which we live.

In this

fantastically complex culture of today, the patterns we intro
ject as desirable or undesirable come from a variety of sources
and are often highly contradictory in their meanings.

Let me

list a few of the introjections which are common held.
Sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad. The sources
of this construct are many-parents, church, teachers.
Disobedience is bad.
Here parents and teachers combine
with the military to emphasize this concept. To obey is
good. To obey without question is even better.
Making money is the highest good. The sources of this con
ceived value are too numerous to mention.
Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly
desirable.
Browsing and aimless exploratory reading for fun is
undesirable.
The source of these last two concepts is apt to be the
school, the educational system.
Abstract art is good.
Here the people we regard as sophis
tacted are the originators of the value.
Communism is utterly bad.
source.

Here the government is a major

To love thy neighbor is the highest good. This concept
comes from the church, perhaps from the parents.
Cooperation and teamwork are preferable to acting alone.
Here companions are an important source.
Cheating is clever and desirable.
is the origin.

The peer group again

Coca-colas, chewing gum, electric refrigerators, andauto
mobiles are all utterly desirable. This conception comes
not only from advertisements, but is reinforced by people
all over the world.
From Jamaica to Japan, from Copen
hagen to Kowloon, the "Coca-Cola culture" has come to be
regarded as the acme of desirability.
This is a small and diversified sample of the myriads of
conceived values which individuals often introject, and hold as
their own, without ever having considered their inner organismic
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reactions to these patterns and objects.
Common Characteristics of Adult Valuing
I believe it will be clear from the foregoing that the
usual adult- I feel I am speaking for most of us -

has an ap

proach to values which has these characteristics:
The majority of his values are introjected from other
individuals or groups significant to him, but are
regarded by him as his own.
The source or locus of evaluation on most matters lies
outside of himself.
The criterion by which his values are set is the degree
to which they will cause him to be loved or accepted.
These conceived preferences are either not related
at all, or not clearly related, to his own process
of experiencing.
Often there is a wide and unrecognized discrepancy be
tween the evidence supplied by his own experience and
these conceived values.
Because these conceptions are not open to testing in
experience, he must hold them in a rigid and unchanging fashion.
The alternative would be a collapse of
his values.
Hence his values are "right" like the
law of the Medes and the Persians, which changeth not.
Because they are untestable, there is no ready way of solving contradictions.

If he has taken in from the community the

conception that money is the summum bonum and from the church
the conception that love of one's neighbor is the highest value,
he has no way of discovering which has more value for him.
Hence a common aspect of modern life is living with absolutely
contradictory values.

We calmly discuss the possibility of drop

ping a hydrogen bomb on Russia, but then find tears in our eyes
when we see headlines about the suffering of one small child.
Because he has relinquished the locus of evaluation to
others, and has lost touch with his own valuing process, he feels
profoundly insecure and easily threatened in his values.

If some

of these conceptions were destroyed, what would take their
place?

This threatening possiblity makes him hold his value con

ceptions more rigidly or more confusedly, or both.
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The Fundamental Discrepancy
I believe that this picture of the individual, with values
mostly introjected held as fixed concepts, rarely examined or
tested, is the picture of most of us.

By taking over the con

ceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with thepotential
wisdom of our own functioning, and lost confidence in ourselves.
Since these value constructs are often sharply at variance with
what is going on in our own experiencing, we have in a very

basic

way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for
much of modern strain and insecurity.

This fundamental discrep

ancy between the individual's concepts and what he is actually
experiencing, between the intellectual structure of his values
and the valuing process going on unrecognized within him- this
is a part of the fundamental estrangement of modern man from him
self.

This is a major problem for the therapist.

Restoring Contact with Experience
Some individuals are fortunate in going beyond the picture
I have just given, developing further in the direction of psycho
logical maturity.

We see this happen in psychotherapy where we

endeavor to provide a climate favorable to the growth of a per
son.

We also see it happen in life, whenever life provides a

therapeutic climate for the individual.

Let me concentrate on

this further maturing of a value approach as I have seen it in
therapy.
In the first place, let me say somewhat parenthetically
that the therapeutic relationship is not devoid of values.
Quite the contrary.

When it is most effective, it seems to me,

it is marked by one primary value; namely, that this person,
this client, has worth.
arateness and uniqueness.

He as a person is valued in his sep
It is when he senses and realizes

that he is prized as a person that he can slowly begin to value
the different aspects of himself.

Most importantly, he can be

gin to value the different aspects of himself.

Most importantly,

he can begin, with much difficulty at first, to sense and to
feel what is going on within him, what he is feeling, what he is
experiencing, how he is reacting.
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He uses his experiencing as

a direct reference to which he can turn in forming accurate con
ceptualizations and as a guide to his behavior. Gendlin has
3
elaborated the way in which this occurs.
As his experiencing
becomes more and more open to him, as he is able to live more
freely in the process of his feelings, then significant changes
begin to occur in his approach to values.

It begins to assume

many of the characteristics it had in infancy.
Introjected Values in Relation to Experiencing
Perhaps I can indicate this by reviewing a few of the brief
examples of introjected values which I have given, and suggest
ing what happens to them as the individual comes closer to what
is going on within him.
The individual in therapy looks back and realizes, "But
I enjoyed pulling my sister's hair-and that doesn't
make me a bad person."
The student failing chemistry realizes, as he gets close
to his own experiencing-"I don't value being a doctor,
even though my parents do; I don't like chemistry; I
don't like taking steps toward being a doctor; and I am
not a failure for having these feelings."
The adult recognizes that sexual desires and behavior
may be richly satisfying and permanently enriching in
their consequences, or shallow and temporary and less th a n
satisfying. He goes by his own experiencing, which does
not always coincide with the social norms.
He considers art from a new value approach.
He says,
"This picture moves me deeply, means a great deal to
me.
It also happens to be an abstraction, but that is
not the basis for my valuing it."
He recognizes freely that this communist book or person
has attitudes and goals which he shares as well as ideas
and values which he does not share.
He realizes that at times he experiences cooperation
as meaningful and valuable to him, and that at other
times he wishes to be alone and act alone.
Valuing in the Mature Person
The valuing process which seems to develop in this more
mature person is in some ways very much like that in the infant,
and in some ways quite different.

It is fluid, flexible, based

on this particular moment, and the degree to which this moment
is experienced as enhancing and actualizing.
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Values are not

held rigidly, but are continually changing.

The painting which

last year seemed meaningful now appears uninteresting, the way
of working with individuals which was formerly experienced as
good now seems inadequate, the belief which then seemed true is
now experienced as only partly true, or perhaps false.
Another characteristic of the way this person values ex
perience is that it is highly differentiated, or as the semanti
cists would say, extensional.

As the members of my class of

prospective teachers learned, general principles are not as use
ful as sensitively discriminating reactions.

One says, "With

this little boy, I just felt I should be very firm, and he seemed
to welcome that, and I felt good that I had been.

But I'm not

that way at all with the other children most of the time."

She

was relying on her experiencing of the relationship with each
child to guide her behavior.

I have already indicated, in going

through the examples how much more differentiated are the indi
vidual's reactions to what were previously rather solid mono
lithic introjected value.
In another way the mature individual's approach is like
that of the infant.

The locus of evaluation is again established

firmly within the person.

It is his own experience which pro

vides the value information or feedback.

This does not mean that

he is not open to all the evidence he can obtain from other
sources.

But it means that this is taken for what it i s - out

side evidence-and is not as significant as his own reactions.
Thus he may be told by a friend that a new book is very disap
pointing.

He reads two unfavorable reviews of the book.

Thus

his tentative hypothesis is that he will not value the book.
Yet if he reads the book his valuing will be based upon the re
actions it stirs in him, not on what he has been told byothers.
There is also involved in this valuing process a letting
oneself down into the immediacy of what one is experiencing, en
deavoring to sense and to clarify all its complex meanings.

I

think of a client who, toward the close of therapy, when puz
zled about an issue, would put his head in his hands and say,
"Now what is it that I'm feeling?
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I want to get next to it.

I

want to learn what it is."

Then he would wait, quietly and

patiently, trying to listen to himself, until he could discern
the exact flavor of the feelings he was experienceing.

He, like

others, was trying to get close to himself.
In getting close to what is going on within himself, the
process is much more complex than it is in the infant.

In the

mature person it has much more scope and sweep, for there is in
volved in the present moment of experiencing the memory traces
of all the relevant learnings from the past.

This moment has not

only its immediate sensory impact, but it has meaning growing
4
out of similar experiences in the past.
It has both the new
and the old in it.

So when I experience a painting of a person,

my experiencing contains within it the learnings I have accumu
lated from past meetings with paintings or persons, as well as
the new impact of this particular encounter.

Likewise the moment

of experiencing contains, for the mature adult, hypothese about
consequences.

"I feel now that I would enjoy a third drink, but

past learnings indicate that I may regret it in the morning."
"It is not pleasant to express forthrightly my negative feeli gs
to this person, but past experience indicates that in a conti u
ing relationship it will be helpful in the long run."

Past and

future are both in this moment and enter into the valuing.
I find that in the person I am speaking of (and here again
we see a similarity to the infant) the criterion of the valuing
process is the degree to which the object of the experience ac
tualizes the individual himself.

Does it make him a richer,

more complete, more fully developed person?

This may sound as

though it were a selfish or unsocial criterion, but it does not
prove to be so, since deep and helpful relationships with others
are experienced as actualizing.
Like the infant, too, the psychologically mature adult
trusts and uses the wisdom of his organism, with the difference
that he is able to do so knowingly.

He realizes that if he can

trust all of himself, his feelings and his intuitions may be
wiser than his mind, that as a total person he can be more sen
sitive and accurate than his thoughts alone.
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Hence he is not

afraid to say-"! feel that this experience (or this thing, or
this direction)
it is good."

is good.

Later I will probably know why I feel

He trusts the totality of himself.

It should be evident from what I have been saying that this
valuing process in the mature individual is not an easy or simple
thing.

The process is complex, the choices often very perplexing

and difficult, and there is no guarantee that the choice which is
made will in fact prove to be self-actualizing.

But because what

ever evidence exists is available to the individual, and because
he is open to his experiencing, errors are correctable.

If this

chosen course of action is not self-enhancing this will be sensed
and he can make an adjustment or revision.

He thrives on a max

imum feedback interchange, and thus, like the gyroscopic compass
on a ship, can continually correct his course toward his true
goal of self-fulfillment.
Some Propositions Regarding
the Valuing Process
Let me sharpen the meaning of what I have been saying by
stating two propositions which contain the essential elements of
this viewpoint.

While it may not be possible to devise empiri

cal testsof each proposition in its entirety, each is to some
degree capable of being tested through the methods of science.
I would also state that though the following propositions are
stated firmly in order to give them clarity, I am actually ad
vancing them as decidedly tentative hypotheses.
1.

There is an organismic base for an organized valuing
process within the human individual.

It is hypothesized that this base is s-omething the human
being shares with the rest of the animate world.

It is part of

the functioning life process of any healthy organism.

It is the

capacity for receiving feedback information which enables the
organism continually to adjust its behavior and reactions so as
to achieve the maximum possible self-enhancement.
2.

This valuing process in the human being is effective
in achieving self-enhancement to the degree that the
individual is open to the experiencing which is going
on within himself.
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I have tried to give two examples of individuals who are
close to their own experiencing:

the tiny infant who has not

yet learned to deny in his awareness the processes going on with
in; and the psychologically mature person who has relearned the
advantages of this open state.
There is a corollary to this second proposition which might
be put in the following terms.

One way of assisting the indi

vidual to move toward openness to experience is through a rela
tionship in which he is prized as a separate person, in which
the experiencing going on within him is empathetically under
stood and valued, and in which he is given the freedom to exper
ience his own feelings and those of others without being threat
ened in doing so.
This corollary obviously grows out of therapeutic experience.
It is a brief statement of the essential qualities in the thera
peutic relationship.

There are already some empirical studies,

of which the one by Barrett-Lennard is a good example, which
gives support to such a statement.

5

Propositions Reqardin~
fhe Outcome of the Valuing Process
I come now to the nub of any theory of values or valuing.
What are its consequences?

I should like to move into this new

ground by stating bluntly two propositions as to the qualities
of behavior which emerge from this valuing process.

I shall

then give some of the evidence from my own experience as a thera
pist in the support of these propositions.
3.

In persons who are moving toward greater openness to
their experiencing, there is an organismic commonality
of value directions.

4.

These common value directions are of such kinds as to
enhance the development of the individual himself, of
others in his community, and to make for the survival
and evolution of his species.

It has been a striking fact of my experience that in th r
apy, where individuals are valued, where there is greater fre e 
dom to feel and to be, certain value directions seem to emerg e .
There are not chaotic directions but instead have a surprising
commonality.

This commonality is not dependent
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on the

personality

of the therapist, for I have seen these trends emerge in the
clients of therapists sharply different in personality.

This

commonality does not seem to be due to the influence of any one
culture, for I have found evidence of these directions in cul
tures as divergent as those of the United States, Holland,
France, and Japan.

I like to think that this commonality of

value directions is due to the fact that we all belong to the
same species- that just as a human infant tends, individually,
to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants,
so a client in thereapy tends, individually, to choose value
directions similar to those chosen by other clients.

As a

species there may be certain elements of experience which tend
to make for inner development and which would be chosen by all
individuals if they were genuinely free to choose.
Let me indicate a few of these value directions as I see
them in my clients as they move in the direction of personal
growth and maturity.
They tend to move away from facades.

Pretense, defensive

ness, putting up a front, tend to be negatively valued.
They tend to move away from "oughts."

The compelling feel

ing of "I ought to do or be thus and so" is negatively valued.
The client moves away from being what he "ought to be," no matter
who has set that imperative.
They tend to move away from meeting the expectations of
others.

Pleasing others, as a goal in itself, is negatively

valued.
Being real is positively valued,

The client tends to move

toward being himself, being his real feelings, being what he is.
This seems to be a very~deep preference.
Self-direction is positively valued.

The client discovers

an increasing pride and confidence in making his own choices,
guiding his own life.
One's self, one's own feelings come to be positively valued.
From a point where he looks upon himself with contempt and des
pair, the client comes to value himself and his reactions as be
ing of worth,
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Being a process is positively valued.

From desiring some

fixed goal, clients come to prefer the excitement of being a
process of potentialities being born.
Perhaps more than all else, the client comes to value an
openness to all of his inner and outer experience.
and sensitive to his own inner reactions and

To be open to

feelings, the re

actions and feelings of others, and the realities of the objec
tive world-this is a direction which he clearly prefers.

This

openness becomes the client's most valued resource.
Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is positively
valued.

The client comes to appreciate others for what they are,

just as he has come to appreciate himself for what he is.
Finally, deep relationships are positively valued.

To

achieve a close, intimate, real, fully communicative relation
ship with another person seems to meet a deep need in every in
dividual, and is very highly valued.
These then are some of the preferred directions which I have
observed in individuals moving toward personality maturity.
~hough I am sure that the list I have given is inadequate and
perhaps to some degree inaccurate, it holds for me exciting pos
sibilities, let me try to explain why.
I find it significant that when individuals are prized as
persons, the values they select do not run the full gamut of
possibilities.

I do not find, in such a climate of freedom, that

one person comes to value fraud and murder and thievery, while
another values a life of self-sacrifice, and another values only
money.

Instead there seems to be a deep and underlying thread

of commonality.

I dare to believe that when the human being is

inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to
value those objects, experiences, and goals which make for his
own survival, growth, and development, and for the survival and
development of others.

I hypothesize that it is characteristic

of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized
goals when he is exposed to a growth-promoting climate.
A corollary of what I have been saying is that in any cul
ture, given a climate of respect and freedom in which he is
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valued as a person, the mature individual would tend to choose
and prefer these same value directions.

This is a highly sig

nificant hypothesis which could be tested.

It means that though

the individual of whom I am speaking would not have a consistent
or even a stable system of conceived values, the valuing process
within him would lead to emerging value directions which would
be constant across cultures and across time.
Another implication I see is that individuals who exhibit
the fluid valuing process I have tried to describe, whose value
directions are generally those I have listed, would be highly
effective in the ongoing process of human evolution.

If the

human species is to survive at all on this globe, the human be
ing must become more readily adaptive to new problems and situ
ations, must be able to select that which is valuable for develop
ment and survival out of new and complex situations, must be ac
curate in his appreciation of reality if he is to make such se
lections.

The psychologically mature person as I have described

him has, I believe, the qualities which would cause him to value
those experiences which would make for the survival and enhance
ment of the human race.

He would be a worthy participant and

guide in the process of human evolution.
Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of
universality of values, but by a different route.

Instead of

universal values "out there," or a universal value system imposed
by some group-philosophers, rulers, or priests-we have the pos
sibility of universal human value directions emerging from the
experiencing of the human organism.

Evidence from therapy in

dicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural,
and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organ
ismic valuing process.

The suggestion is that though modern man

no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy nor any sys
tem of beliefs to give him his values, he may find an organis
mic valuing base within himself which, if he can learn again to
be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive and
social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of
us.
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Summary
I have tried to present some observations, growing out of
experience in psycho-therapy, which are relevant to man's search
for some satisfying basis for his approach to values.
I have described the human infant as he enters directly into
an evaluating transaction with his world, appreciating or reject
ing his experiences as they have meaning for his own actualiza
tion, utilizing all the wisdom of his tiny but complex organism.
I have said that we seem to lose this capacity for direct
evaluation, and come to behave in those ways and to act in terms
of those values which will bring us social approval, affection,
esteem.

To buy love we relinquish the valuing process.

Because

the center of our lives now lies in others, we are fearful and
insecure, and must cling rigidly to the values we have intro
jected.
But if life or therapy gives us favorable conditions for
continuing our psychological growth, we move on in something of
a spiral, developing an approach to values which partakes of the
infant's directness and fluidity but goes far beyond hi~ in its
richness.

In our transactions with experience we are again the

locus or source of valuing, we prefer those experiences which in
the long run are enhancing, we utilize all the richness of our
cognitive learning and functioning, but at the same time we trust
the wisdom of our organism.
I have pointed out that these observations lead to certain
basic statements.
valuing.

Man has within him an organismic bases for

To the extent that he can be freely in touch with this

v,aluing process in himself, he will behave in ways which are
self-enhancing.

We even know some of the conditions which en

able him to be in touch with his own experienceing process.
In therapy, such openness to experience leads to emerging
value directions which appear to be common across individuals
and perhaps even across cultures.

Stated in older terms, indi

viduals who are thus in touch with their experiencing come to
value such directions as sincerity, independence, self-direction,
self-knowledge, social responsibility, and loving interpersonal
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relationships.
I have concluded that a new kind of emergent universality
of value directions becomes possible when individuals move in the
direction of psychological maturity, or more accurately, move in
the direction of becoming open to their experiencing.

Such a

value base appears to make for the enhancement of self and others,
and to promote a positive evolutionary process.
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HELPING CHILDREN TO CLARIFY VALUES
by
Louis E. Raths and Sidney B. Simon
(Reprinted by permission from N. E. A. Journal ,
October 1967, pp. 12-15.)

Modern life in the United States is rich with choices and
opportunities, but it is also very confusing.

It is far more dif

ficult for a child to develop clear values today than it was in
the simpler, more austere life of the turn of the century.
One major reason for this is the change in the family, where
many believe, values develop.

In recent decades, Americans have

seen dramatic, if not frightening, changes in the family - work
ing mothers (one out of three), broken homes (estimated at one
out of five), and geographic mobility (about one family in five
moves every year).

Family sharing has decreased.

The consequence,

we submit, has been a growing confusion in the life of children.
When the family defaulted, society passed the buck to the
schools.

To avoid controversy, many schools began to stand for

nothing.

Teachers turned toward "teaching the facts."

Adminis

trators tended to prefer teachers who did not raise issues.

In

communities consisting of strangers with many different back
grounds, it became easier to have schools which represented no
moral consensus.
The question we must answer today, then, is:

What can

schools in a heterogeneous society do in the teaching of values?
Before arriving at an answer, it is necessary to define the terms
and say not only what values are but by what processes people ac
quire them.
Individuals have experiences.

Out of these may come cer

tain general guides to behavior - values - which tend to give
direction to life.

Values evolve and mature as experiences

evolve and mature.

I

Because values are a part of living, they operate in very

I

complex circumstances and usually involve more than simple

I

I
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extremes of right and wrong, good and bad, true and false.

The

conditions in which values work t y pically involve conflicting
demands, a weighing and balancing, and finally an action that re
flects a multitude of forces.

Since each person's experiences

are different, we cannot be certain what values, what style of
life, would be most suitable for any person.

We do, however,

have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for
obtaining sound values.
we see values as based on three processes:
prizing and acting.

choosir.g,

From these we derive seven criteria, all of

which must be satisfied if something is to be called value.

An

adult who wants to help children develop values should, we be
lieve:
Encourage children to make choices, and allow them to
choose freely
Help them discover and examine available alternatives
when faced with choices
Help them weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting
on the consequences of each
Encourage them to consider what it is that they prize
and cherish
Give them opportunitiss to make public affirmations of
their choices
Encourage them to act in accordance with their choices
Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in
their life.
In this way the adult encourages the process of valuing.
The intent of this process is to help children clarify for them
selves what they value.

This is very different from trying to

fersuade children to accept some predetermined set of values by
limiting their choices, enforcing rules and regulations, or
teaching cultural or religious dogma, as some of the traditional
approaches do.
We have no doubt that such methods have in the past con
trolled behavior and even formed beliefs and attitudes, but we
assert that they have not and cannot lead to values in the sense
we are concerned with them-values that represent the free and
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thoughtful choice of intelligent humans interacting with complex
and changing environments.
The traditional approaches listed above would receive a
low grade in terms of their effectiveness in promoting such values
as honor, courage, self-control, and love.
indoctrination:
to be lost.

All have the air of

free inquiry, thoughtfulness, and reason seem

The approach seems to be to persuade the child to

adopt the "right" values rather than to help him develop a valu
ing process.
One reason for the continued use of the old methods is that
no clear and testable alternative has been provided.

We suggest

an approach to clarifying values that rests on a specific method
of responding to things a student says or does.

The strategy,

called clarifying response, is to respond to a student so that
he considers what he has chosen, what he prizes, and/or what he
is doing.
The clarifying response is usually aimed at one student at
a time, often in brief, informal conversations held in class, in
hallways, on the playground, or anyplace else where a student
does or says something to trigger such a response from the
teacher.
Especially ripe for clarifying responses are expressions by
students of attitudes, aspirations, purposes, interests, acti
vities, convictions, worries, and opinions.
that signal a statement of attitudes include:

Typical keywords
I'm for, I'm

against, I think, if you ask me, my choice is, my way of doing it
is, I believe.
As a teacher listens to students, he may mentally plus and
minus their statements-plus for what they are for and minus for
what they are against.

Students are not always aware when they

have revealed what they are for or against and are quite sur
prised to see their inconsistencies.
Teachers must avoid making students feel they will lose face
as they expose their feelings.

It is essential to maintain an

accepting atmosphere and to say sincerely over-and-over again,
"All of us are inconsistent from time to time, and all of us tend
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to be confused about certain things we are for and against.

One

of the things we hope to learn is how to think about our atti
tudes and clarify them."
The purpose of the clarifying response is to raise ques
tions in the mind of the student, to prod him gently to examine
his life, his actions, and his ideas.

The responses lead the

student to no specific value; he does not need to deliver a
"right" answer to a clarifying response.
All of the exchanges will be brief, for an extended series
of probes might give the student the feeling that he is being
cross-examined and make him defensive.
might give him too much to think about.

Also, a long exchange
The idea is to raise a

few questions, leave them hanging in the air, and then move on
without moralizing.

The student to whom the questions are ad

dressed, and others who might overhear, may well ponder them
later.

These gentle prods stimulate students, and our research

indicates that a number of such exchanges add up and make large
differences in some students' lives.
Many of the responses will be geared directly to one of the
seven valuing processes.

For example, when choosing freely is

involved, the teacher may ask, "Where do you suppose you first
got that idea?" or "Are you the only one in your crowd that feels
this way?"

If the student has chosen from alternatives, the

teacher may say, "What else did you consider before you picked
this?" or "What's really good about this choice?"

To help the

student in choosing thoughtfully, the teacher may ask, "What
would be the consequences of each alternative available?" or
"What assumptions are involved in your choice?"
If prizing and cherishing are involved, the teacher may ask,
"How long have you wanted it?" or "In what way would life be dif
ferent without it?"

Another issue is whether the student is will

ing to affirm publicly his choice-"Would you tell the class the
way you feel sometime?"

In reference to acting upon a choice, a

a teacher may ask, "What are your first steps?

Subsequent steps?"

or "Have you examined the consequences of your act?''

Questions

a teacher might ask in relation to the repeating of an action
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include, "Have you felt this way for some time?"
worth the time and money?''

"Has it been

"How long do you think you will con

tinue?"
The following brief exchange shows

how a teacher may use

clarifying responses:
MARY:

Some day I'd like to join the Peace Corps.

TEACHER:
MARY:

Oh, the chance to be of service excites me, and
going to faraway places does too.

TEACHER:
MARY:

Of those two, which is first?

I guess the faraway places part.

TEACHER:
MARY:

What are some good things about that, Mary?

Are you glad that that one is first?

No, I guess people would respect me more if the
service part was first.

TEACHER:

Well, it's been interesting talking to you,
Mary, but I must get back to my papers.
Perhaps we can talk about it another time.

Students are accustomed to having teachers ask questions,
both academic-Who founded Jamestown?-and behavioral-Didn't I
tell you to be quiet?

These questions however, have nothing to

do with the interchange between Mary and the teacher, with the
clarifying approach which respects the individual's rights to
make decisions.
Because many questions teachers customarily ask are really
statements of the teachers' decisions, students often assume that
a question is actually a concealed directive.

To combat this,

the teacher begins to use clarifying questions at times when the
student knows that the teacher is not trying to disapprove of
what he is saying or doing.
The simplest guide in the beginning is for the teacher
to use clarifying responses in situations of which he either
approves or has no preferences.

After students become familiar

with the clarifying responses, they will begin to use them on
one another and on other friends.
Before defining a clarifying response, it may be helpful to
II

I I
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say what it is not.
Clarifying is not therapy.
Clarifying is not used on students with serious
emotional problems.
Clarifying is not a single one-shot effort:
it
depends on a program consistently applied over a
period of time.
Clarifying avoids moralizing, preaching, indoc
trinating, inculcating, or dogmatizing.
Clarifying is not an interview, nor is it done in
a formal manner.
Clarifying is not meant to replace the teacher's
other educational functions.
Clarifying is an honest attempt to help a student look at
his life and to encourage him to think about it in an atmosphere
in which positive acceptance exists.

Students will probably not

enter into the perplexing process of clarifying values for them
selves if they perceive that the teacher does not respect their
viewpoint.

If trust is not communicated, the student may well

play the game, pretending to clarify and think and choose and
prize but being as unaffected by the exchange as by a tiresome
morality lecture.
For many teachers, working with clarification of values
will mean much less talking and a lot more listening.

Teachers

who are able to do this and to ask the right questions begin to
have small miracles happening in their classrooms.

They often

see attendance go up, grades rise, and interest and excitement
in learning crackle.

They see encouraging changes in students

who have been classified as apathetic, listless, and indifferent.
The teacher fits the clarifying response into the value
clarifying method by doing the following:

first, looking and

listening for statements or actions which suggest a value issue
may be involved (he notes especially children who seem to bevery
apathetic, indecisive, flighty, or inconsistent or who tend to
overconform or drift from here to there without reason); second,
keeping in mind the goal-youngsters who have clear, personal
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values; third, responding to a value indicator with a clarifying
question or comment designed to help the student use one or more
of the seven valuing processes.
Though a number of students may overhear a student-teacher
exchange and profit from it, the clarifying response focuses on
one student.

Some techniques for value clarification can be used

with a whole group.

For example, a teacher may give each member

of the class a value sheet which, in its simplest form, consists
of a provocative statement and a series of questions.
The purpose of the statement is to raise an issue that may
have value implications.

The purpose of the questions is to

carry each student through the value clarifying process with that
issue.

Since valuing is an individual matter, each student com

pletes the value sheet by himself.

Later, his answers may be

shared with the teacher or other students and/or used as a basis
for large or small group discussions.
Some value sheets consist of nothing more than a series of
probing questions that are keyed to a common reading or experi
ence.

The questions on the value sheet are in the style of the

valuing theory.

That is, the questions do not try subtly to con

vince a student to believe what the adult believes but to help
him take the issue at hand through the value criteria.
Among the many other classroom methods which a teacher may
use to help children escape from value confusion are role-playing,
devil's advocate (presenting the unpopular side of an issue ) ,
and time diary (each student keeps a record of how he spends his
time and analyzes the record).
How can a teacner begin to incorporate value clarifying
into his teaching?

We suggest that he start by working toward a

classroom climate in which students feel they are respected and
accepted and feel secure enough to think logically and speak
honestly.

At the same time, the teacher must work to eliminate

his own tendencies to moralize.
With valuing processes of choosing, prizing, and acting
ever in mind, the teacher experiments, slowly but steadily, to
find which strategies fit him and work best with his students.
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In a few months he will be able to see results in the way his
students make and act upon their choices.

He may also find he

has clarified some of his own values.

VALUES EDUCATION:

WHAT LIES BEHIND THE BALLYHOO?
by

William E. Collie
Certainly no topic has received more attention in elemen
tary and secondary school circles in recent years than values
education.

For cynics who, over the years, have seen educational

interests come and go, the focus may be viewed as only educa
tional ballyhoo, merely "sound and fury signifying nothing"
which will ride the crest of popularity but, like many fads,
soon be replaced by another emphasis

(back to basics?) having

made little real impact on the actual conduct of the school.

A

closer examination, however, suggests that values education,
while it may lose its primacy as the "in" topic, has the poten
tial for significantly influencing school practice.
As evidence of the lively interest in values education,
look at the educational literature of the last several years.
Professional journals are running a continuing stream of articles
and publishing special issues on values education/moral education
and the various strategies and techniques developed including,
most prominently, values clarification and moral development.
Commercial publishers are spewing forth new curricular materials
with a values emphasis

(or discovering the values slant was

there in the old stuff all along just needing to be publicized).
Professional conferences from school in-service days to national
conventions are offering innumerable section meetings on some
aspect of values education.

And to quench teachers'

"how to do

it" thirst, a number of paperbacks are appearing on educational
bookshelves designed to help teachers develop instructional
strategies for values education (e.g. Hawley, 1975; Hawley and
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Hawley, 1975; Hawley, Simon and Britton, 1973; Fraenkel. 1977;
Kniker, 1977).
In fact, so much is being done under the label "values edu
cation" that it is becoming increasingly difficult to sort
through and make sense of the bombardment of varied conceptual
approaches and curriculum materials now available.
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Douglas

Superka and others (1975) have developed a typology of values
education approaches that enables one to make some sense of what
we refer to as "values education."
terms which we will utilize:

First of all, they define

values are regarded as "criteria

for determining levels of goodness, worth, or beauty," valuing
refers to "the process of developing or actualizing values,"
and values education involves "the explicit attempt to teach
about values and/or valuing."

Superka and associates identified

five commonly used approaches in values education including incul
cation, moral development, analysis, clarification, and action
learning.

Within the five categories, 84 sets of curriculum

materials were analyzed.

In addition, they suggested two other

approaches for which no existing curriculum materials could be
identified.

The evocation approach would "help students express

their values as personal moral emotions without thought or hesi
itation."

The union approach would "help students perceive them

selves and act not as separate egos but as parts of a larger, in
terrelated whole."
Utilizing Superka's categories, it appears that most of
the discussion currently taking place about values and moral edu
cation refers to approaches which deal with moral development
strategies; values analysis with emphasis on development of
rational, analytical skills; or values clarification approaches
which stress identification of person values seen in the context
of feelings and behavior patterns.

The discussion of how values

education ought to take place within these mainstream emphases
has led to a lively debate among proponents of the differing ap
proaches.

Perhaps the most spirited interchange has related to

the adequacy of values clarification or moral development as
singular strategies for values education.
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supporters of values clarification see values as based on
the three processes of choosing, prizing, and acting which com
bined collectively define valuing.

The results of the process

they call "values" (Raths, Harmin, Simon

1966).

Advocates have

developed a number of classroom strategies to facilitate the
process of valuing (Simon, Howe, Kirschenbaum 1972; Simon 1974).
Sidney Simon, the most active spokesman for the approach, en
thusiastically claims that values clarification helps people to
be more purposeful and productive to sharpen their critical think
ing, and to have better relations with each other (Simon and de
Sherbinin, 1975).
Critics of the values clarification approach include
Lawrence Kohlberg, who rejects the values clarification defini
tion of the end of values education as self-awareness because of
its derivation from a belief in ethical relativity (1975).

John

S . Stewart concurs, charging that values clarification is based
on "a theory that is philosophically indefensible and psycholog
ically inadequate"

(1975).

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral develop
ment posits that people think about moral issues in six identi
fiable stages.

Morality is regarded as a natural product of a

tendency toward empathy or role taking and is based on a univer
sal concern for justice.

Kohlberg's theory suggests the highest

stage of moral reasoning is based on universal principles of
justice (Kohlberg 1971, 1975; Fenton 1976, Beyer 1976).

The

moral development approach utilized with students incorporates
peer discussion of value dilemmas to stimulate movement to the
next stage of moral reasoning (Galbraith and Jones 1976; Hersh,
Paolitto, Reimer 1979).
Critics like Richard S. Peters (1975) attack Kohlberg's
emphasis on morality based on a theory of justice as simplistic
when it is viewed as the only form of morality.

He criticizes

Kohlberg for being so wrapped up in the justification for his
own theory that he is ignoring other aspects of morality and
moral learning and development which has been identified by
other scholars working in the field.
35

Jack Fraenkel (1971) points

out the limited scope of the moral dilemma discussion strategy
based only on examination of student-generated action options.
Fraenkel (1976) further questions the adequacy of the rationale
behind the moral reasoning approach for values education.
Fraenkel suggests that intellectual development must be coupled
with emotional development if individuals are to be fully func
tioning and psychologically whole persons.
While an overarching, comprehensive values education theor y
may be lacking, the debate between the specialists does not s e em
to have had serious impact on educational practitioners•.
Teachers at the elementary and secondary levels, and in teacher
education as well, have adopted either or both approaches on
pragmatic grounds -- the strategies are clearcut, easily mastered.
adaptable to a variety of classroom settings, and enjoyed by the
students.
Values clarification and moral development approaches pro
vide the classroom teacher with immediate reward.

The rationale

behind the approaches sounds plausible, and the teacher can feel
comfortable getting involved in these kinds of moral/values exam
ination which do not operate from a religious base.

Both ap

proaches relate to individual concerns of the students or to con
cerns with which they can easily identify.

Issues raised on the

more personal level, even though they may be extended to more
universal concerns, are much more satisfying than the values
analysis approach, for example, which urges consideration of
complex social issues that often appear to be too far removed
from student life or to require too much knowledge for students
to successfully use.

In contrast to the inculcation approach,

both values clarification and moral development approaches to
values education remove the stigma of authoritarian values pro
mulgator from the teacher role.
Stronger than any curricular approach to values education
which may be implemented in the existing structure of the
schools may be the revision of the moral environment of the
school itself,

Kohlberg (1976) among others has argued that the

true ''hidden curriculum" of the schools is the subtle,
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unrecognized moral teaching of the school atmosphere, a curricu
lum so potent that its force can overwhelm and make meaningless
any new moral education approach imposed on it.
Building on Kohlberg's premise that moral education
grounded on a theory of justice is in actuality the proper basis
for civic education, a number of pilot schools have been estab
lished to test his "just community concept."

Wasserman (1976)

describes the establishment of a Cluster School within Cambridge
(Massachusetts) High and Latin School.

The school is composed

of faculty and ninth to twelfth grade student volunteers enrolled
in a core curriculum of English and social studies.

The curric

ulum centers on role taking, on moral discussions, and on re
lating the governance structure of the school to the wider com
munity.

The rules and procedures are established by the com

munity.

Preliminary progress reports indicate a developing sense

of community and higher morale.

Research regarding progress in

moral reasoning in this learning environment has just begun.
Wasserman also reports two other school reorganization pro
grams to fit the developmental model.

In Brookline, Massachu

setts, an existing school-within-a-school is establishing a democratic governance structure.

In the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

area Carnegie-Mellon University is working with three school
districts and a private academy to develop Civic Education
Schools or classes within the schools.

Danforth Foundation sup-

port for all three programs will enable cooperative planning and
information exchange.
Attempts such as those described by Wasserman suggest that
values education can have an impact far greater than any single
approach.

Returning to Superka's categories, these project

schools appear to incorporate several approaches to values edu
cation -- moral development, values analysis, values clarifica
tion, and social action -- within a school structure in which
the participants are able to more freely practice their moral
and value choices. Such experiments can put the philosophical
and developmental assumptions behind moral development theory to
the ultimate test.
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Values education seemingly has found an institutional home
in the schools.

However, it is now a melange of varied approach e:

based on differing goals and objectives and utilizing disparate
strategies.

For values education to have significant impact on

the schools, the place of values education in the school setting
will have to be radically reconceptualized beyond merely being
regarded as a new approach to be tacked onto or integrated with
the existing curriculum.

Further, serious examination of the

social structure and the interactive patterns of the schools
will be necessary if an environment conducive to moral growth
is to exist.
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DO VALUES CHANGE?

YES!

RE-EVALUATION OF OLD VALUES
by

Ronald Mazus
(Reprinted by permission from Penny ' s FoY'Ul71,
Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 16.)

"Values" is an elusive concept.

When used in a discussion

or a presentation of ideas, the term often conveys comfort to
the audience addressed, for, after all, we are all in favor of
everyone having values, preferably our own.

But what is judged

to be significantly worthwhile in life varies from culture-to
culture, society-to-society, person-to-person.
self begs many questions and issues.

The concept it

One can tell more about a

person's values in any given situation by what the person does
rather than by what that person says.
self begs a question:

Yet, that statement it

how can we always be sure of another's

motivations and meanings?
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It is one of my assumptions that all values are relative
to at least three experienced facts:

the sense of self (I

ness); the existence of others; the environment of Nature. These
three given aspects of reality are not created by me, but my
perception of them and their continuously changing and complex
interrelationship shapes them in part.

For I bring to those ex

periences my imagination, memory, wants, needs, attitudes, goals,
knowledge, willing, beliefs, behavior, emotions, and biological
inheritance.

To some extent, each of us creates a personal and

unique reality.
It is our search for values-as-common-good which prevents
our private realities from random clashing and mutual destruc
tion.

It is possible, of course, to go to either extreme of

values-as-common-good:

Political oppression, war and fanaticism

when it is overstressed; psychosis or character pathology when
it is understressed.

There will always be stress between indi

vidual freedom and social order, but this tension can be crea
tive, especially in a society which allows and protects a plural
ism of values.

I am claiming then, that it is a social good-a

value-for us to take seriously the pursuit of meaning-in-com
munity in order to maximize both societal and individual well
being.

Indeed, I recognize and accept for myself a long list of

values, virtues or goods (versus evils).

I expend an extra

ordinary amount of my time, emotional and intellectual resources,
and psychic energy trying to actualize certain deeply held values
which have to do with personal growth, group joy, and world com
munity.
However, even if I did believe that there are unchanging
values in life and the universe, such a philosophical conviction
would provide small comfort and little direction for me.

I do

not believe that there are values outside of persons which are
initiated from a Platonic realm, or divinely revealed, or which
are applicable to all persons and that valuing is a complex pro
cess involving creation, risk and courage; values are not some
thing you have but something you do.

In other words, I hold

values to be experiential and situational.
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We have a choice in

the worldview which we will choose as ours and act upon in
spite of the awareness of the demonic potential of all idealIt is ours to evaluate, risk, decide and act. Every
ogies.
value is created the moment it is chosen, willed and expressed.
Friendship, for example, is not a thing which exists between
two people; it is a constantly changing relational dynamic which
deepens or dies according to what each person brings to the other
to share something of who they are at that time.

And that iden

tical constellation of evaluating, risking, deciding and acting
may never again occur, leaving that particular moment of being
and response unique.

Though I may use past experiences, I never

theless face "new occasions which teach new duties" and I am
left in my aloneness to choose among my many value-concepts in
order to contribute to any situation the most creative human re
sponse of which I am capable.

Most of the time, of course, I

am not confronted with such momentous decision-making; habit,
conditioning, character and personality help me, for better or
for worse, in the quiet survival of each day.
But the times certainly are numerous enough when I en
counter experiences which require radical re-evaluation of old
values.

There are times to hold on to friends and times to let

them go; times to endure suffering and times to fight it; times
for passionate sex and times for gentle sensuality; times for
disciplined reflection and times for controversial action; times
for involvement and times for detachment; times to trust and
times to withhold trust; times for privacy and times for open
ness-in-community.

And so we could go on and on, not merely

imitating the rhetoric of Ecclesiastes, but being painfully
aware of the paradoxes, absurdities, ironies, inconsistencies,
and unpredictabilities of living which make us vulnerable to
hurt and which make it imperative that somehow we find the
courage to be in spite of all insecurities and anxieties.
In our eagerness to hold on to old values in their old
contexts we will find not security but cultural and personal
stagnation.

As the late Abraham Maslow expressed it (Easlen

Papers, 1968), "the self-actualizing person, for the most part,
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transcends the values of his culture."

Religious and educa

tional institutions which have responsibility for the nurture
of youth and adults should embrace the potential of the future
and prepare people to confront it not with shock but with con
fidence based on emerging values-values which individuals should
have the dignity to discover within themselves and through their
own experiencing.
The process of education is basically value-venturing, but
institutions of education seem distrustful of the capacity and
desire of learners to explore, discover, experiment, and create.
Educators often seem more secure in the role of technicians of
stereotyped truths and values rather than participating in an
on-going valuing process.

The quest for a hierarchy of values

or a set of values is, I believe, misleading because it misses
the more critical issue of developing the individual's ability
to utilize value-making criteria in ever-changing contexts.
Even a value framework at one maturational stage of a person
will not be the same value framework of another maturational
stage of that same individual.

And, certainly, the values of

the contemporary generation are not identical to those of its
preceding generation, for new times bring new challenges which
require new responses.

The contemporary movements for world

community, alternative lifestyles and people's liberation con
tain the promise of a higher order of human being.

We can cre

ate that reality if we do not fear value-venturing.

DO VALUES CHANGE?

NO!

VALUES AS A CONSTANT
by

David R. Mace
(Reprinted by permission from Penny ' s
Spring, Summer, 1972, p. 17.)

Fo rwn,

I find discussion of values as exasperating as discussions
of love, and for the same reason-because the words have no
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precise meaning, so that every speaker invests them with mean
ings of his own.

I therefore propose in this article to present

a conceptual framework that can be understood even by relatively
young children.

It may be philosophically vulnerable, but it is

pedagogically serviceable.
In order to think clearly and communicate intelligibly
about this subject, I find I need to consider my relationships
to others at three levels-of values, of standards, and of be
havior.

At the top level, clouds in the sky represent values

they are ethereal and relatively formless.

At the next level,

boxes represent standards-they are rigid and clearly defined.
At the lower level

(down-to-earth) people interacting represent

behavior.
These three concepts are normally inter-related.

The

values are the ultimate ideals and goals of mankind, which do
not undergo basic change.

The standards represent the attempts

of human communities and groups to make rules which will ensure
that the values are preserved and expressed.

Behavior repre

sents the manner in which individual men and women interact with
each other, normally by conforming to the standards in order to
preserve the values.
Now let us look at each of these three levels a little more
closely.

The values, in my view, do not undergo basic change.

They are integrally associated with the goals of human life.

I

hold that man has evolved beyond the animal level at which first
survival, then immediate gratification, are the only consciously
sought goals.

The development of the human imagination enables

man to step out of the narrow confines of the immediate present
and to contemplate the past and the future.

Thus he sees his

life moving onward and, hopefully, progressing upward.

He dreams

of preserving the goods he has and of gaining greater goods in
the future.

Thus he takes command of his destiny and plans

ahead.
But I cannot plan my life on an individual basis.
bound to others who travel with me.
together.

I am

They and I stand or fall

So I must work out with the members of my family,
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tribe, or nation some agreement about our corporate goals.
This is the process of defining our values.
In this process, we are not free to follow unfettered imagi
nation.
vival.

There are conditions that must be met for mutual sur
This is even true of the animal world, as Prince Kro

potkin demonstrated in his

Mutual Aid.

Unless individuals co-

operate in seeking group ends together, they create conditions in
which their individual ends are finally defeated.
that must be met represent the values.
different ways.

The conditions

They can be described in

Some would say the basic value is justice, other s

would say it was love.

We often speak of beauty, truth and good

ness as values; and though they may be associated with qualityof
life rather than with survival, they are valid, because man's goal
is to do more than survive.
We can speak of these values in many words, and that doesn't
matter.

The clouds do not need fixed forms.

But they are inher

ently immutable, because they represent the conditions which must
be met if human communities are not to degenerate or perish.
We see a good example in microcosm of a human community degener
ating for lack of values in William Golding's book

Lord of the Flies.

It would be theoretically possible to have a human community
so dedicated to its values that behavior would not need to be pre
scribed or controlled, but could be left to individual responsi
bility.

This is the policy prescribed by situation ethics, and

it can be realized in a really good family and even for a time in
a larger community.

But up to now in human history, there have

been too many immature and perverse individuals to make it practi
cable to give th€m total freedom and trust them to live by the
community values.

So it has been necessary to establish standards.

These are the boxes in our diagram and they represent customs,
rules, and codes that interpret the correct behavior which will
lead to the preservation of the values.

The boxes have rather

different shapes in different communities, varying with the cir
cumstances in which people have to live.

The boxes have to be

rigid in form so that all concerned can see clearly wh3t the law
is that they have to obey.

But in spite of this rigidity,
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standards are always having to be modified to meet special cases
and changing circumstances.

This is specially true in a time of

cultural change like that through which we are now passing.
standards today are in confusion.
this means we need no values.

Our

But it is inaccurate to say that

It is simply that we are in the

process of re-interpreting how our immutable values can be most
effectively reflected in behavior under the new conditions in
which we are living. ,
The hope of many today is that we may be able, in a free
and pluralistic society, to dispense with rigid standards and fol
low the situational mode of living in direct individual re s ponse
to our ultimate values.
iment.

This represents a novel and daring exper

Theoretically, in a world of really mature people, there

is no reason why this should not be possible.
this stage in human development,

In practice, at

the difficulties are formidable.

DO WE NEED MORAL EDUCATION?
by
Ronald G. Helms
(Reprinted by permission from The Ohio Council for the Social Studie s Review,
Spring 1974.)

Today we often hear that people are behaving as the y do be
cause of a breakdown in moral values.
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Some people assume that a

lack of religious upbringing is central to the plight of out mis
guided society.

Others reason that our value crisis stems from

future shock, erosion of family life, cosmopolitan effects of
mass media, revolution in science and technology, and the com
plexity of ecological problems.
While we are not certain about all the causes of increasing
violence, drug use, and sexual promiscuity in contemporary Ameri
can society, we are advised by leaders in the field of moral edu
cation that many people are beset with moral confusion.

We are

advised that many people, young and old, are unaware of their
moral responsibilities to themselves and to other people.
But how did we reach this state of moral confusion?

Let

us review some historical origins of traditional value systems
and see how the systems have broken down.
Throughout most of history the direction of cultural devel
opment was often determined by military power, by a church-state
authoritarianism, or by some other type of entrenched body which
defined institutions and interpreted the value system.

The in

dividualization, industrialization, and increasing population of
the twentieth century have tended to diversify culture as well
as value systems.
In the past Americans were largely concerned with the incul
cation of the puritan ethic.

In the past we accepted the dual

tenets that "fear is the mother of morality" and that "morality
is the rationalization of self-interest."

In contrast, today we

are attempting to eliminate fear from the life of the child; to
day we often insist that morality should not be limited to self
interest.
In a time in which morals were viewed as God-given, immut
able, and absolute, the morality of children and adults could
be assumed to be synonymous.

In the past we were in relative

agreement as to the content of these absolute morals, and the
institutions of home, church, and school were much in agreement
in the task of transmitting the culture values to the youth.

To

day we find that, although these institutions are still very
much concerned with teaching morality, the teachings have become
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more pluralistic.

Each institution inculcates in children values

which may be widely divergent from the values instilled by other
institutions.

This diversity in values training has resulted in

a peoples harried by confusion and anomie.
Thus, we have eliminated the absolute aspect of morality,
the three institutions are no longer in complete concurrence,
and we have eliminated fear as the basis of morality.

Yet, our

society need not remain in this state of uncertainty.
Although this moral dilemma readily evidences negative im
plications for society, there exist positive implications as
well.

For example, people may be forced to reflect upon moral

issues and thus discover and admit limitations in their ownmoral
reasoning.

After a number of people

begin to realize that their

framework of values is indeed unsteady, it is hoped that portion
of these will determine that the value system should be bolstered.
Since we often look to youth for flexibility and to edu
cators for guidance, perhaps a logical approach to a stable,
rational system of morals is the development of moral education
within the existing school curriculum.

Educators must face this

situation and accept their responsibility for providing a method
of early moral development.
We should at the outset distinguish between moral education
and moralistic education.

Moralistic education refers to past

and ongoing practices of instilling, inculcating, and indoctri
nating a common set of values within children.

Moral education

as we will use the term refers to a process of state-to-stage
development-a continual process which is learned rather than
reached automatically.

Moralistic education is based upon abso

lute answers and thus may involve passive acceptance; whereas
the process of moral education can be stimulated and enriched by
presenting children with moral dilemmas.

Theoretically, through

the latter process, the child can be assisted toward more mature
moral reasoning and a better resolution of moral problems.
In times past the traditional school curriculum utilized
fables and similar moralistic "lessons" to inculcate "right"
conduct.

The child was trained to recite righteous precepts in
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the belief that recitation would lead to practice.

The school,

church, and family utilized sermonizing as a method of instilling
morality.

Although this moralization did seem to work, we might

ask, was the instilling practice itself moral?

Moralization

might seem to guarantee a standard of behavior, but is standard
ization moral?
As some people recognize that moralistic education may in
deed have a constraining effect upon the spirit of the indivi
dual, they propose that the school system abandon all training
dealing with morals.

However, we must recognize that so long

as educatiors maintain that their role is one of guidance and
leadership, valueless teaching will not be possible and therefore
a morality-free school cannot exist.
If we conclude that values will permeate the curriculum,
then surely values education should be based upon the twin con
cepts of individual moral autonomy and justice.
The over-riding goal of moral education is that each person
will be able to independently define his own value structure.
Moral educators would agree that this is the most important func
tion of the curriculum.

The new morality would emphasize the

establishment of a system of justice which would promote the
well-being of the person as an individual.
This stress on independence and autonomy should not be a
focal point of confusion.

We are not advocating the removal of

fear in order to substitute the pleasure principle.

I

II

While we

would not advance a codification of values, we would agree that
a new "planless ocde'' or a libertine situation would not be any
more beneficial.
It is not standardization which we seek, but justice.
People must be able to, in their own frame of reference, differ
entiate between their values.

Teachers must be prepared to recog

nize that children come to school with different focal points in
regard to moral development.

And so, in twelve years of school

ing-even in a traditional curriculum-they will not graduate at
the same level.

Of course, teachers will also be at varying

levels of moral development.
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Justice, the second of our twin concepts in values educa
tion, has in the past been derived from arbitrary authority.
Individuals have either been unwilling to define justice
for themselves or else they have not been equipped to do so.
For definition we have in the past turned to authority, to models,
to special revelation, to faith, or to parental dictate rather
than to rely upon our own moral reasoning.

Teachers today must

function to give students alternatives in the above ready refer
ences.

Before educators can presume to institute a curriculum

centering upon the concept of justice, we must recognize that
justice cannot be taught in an unjust school.
need to recognize the injustices of our system.

As educators we
The school is

most certainly a legal institution; however, a legal system is
not always a moral system.

Our only claim to moral superiority

is through our commitment to justice.
For the complicated task of assisting students in moral
development, there must be some framework of approach.

A school

cannot hope to teach about values or morals simply by offering
one elective in the senior year; the curriculum K-12 must reflect
a commitment to moral development.

Moral education must be in

tegrated with reflection, inquiry, and citizenship skills.
Teachers must develop additional cognitive skills.

Adminis

trators will need to value the systematic research efforts of
scholars in the field.

Finally, schools as social institutions

must serve as microcosmic models of a just society.
In contrast, there are many forms of psychotherapy for the
psychiatrically disturbed.

What skilled counsel is there for the

increasing millions whose problem is not psychiatric, but rather
a problem of finding meaning in an age that has made the loss of
purpose a veritable life-style?
enough.

A theoretical ethics is not

Given our present moral knowledge and human needs, a

new discipline of Life Values Education, and particularly of Life
Values guidance and counseling, is both a possibility and a ne
cessity.

It is this human and social need which I believe human

istic ethicists must be prepared to serve.

Life Values Education

would enable people to exmine more critically and expertly the
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logic of their aimless or drifting lives. They would be en
abled to see more clearly what must be abandoned in their life
plans, if they are to realize their deeper values and more hu
manizing goals.
The same examination must extend to our social morality
and to the questionable assumptions upon which our industrial and
commercial systems operate-assumptions that have been newly ex
posed by the rebellion of youth and the necessity of living with
in the limits of our human and natural environments.
We need therefore, to develop a disciplined "value analy
sis"-or

(to coin a term using the Greek prefix for value) an

"axio-analysis"-of the ways we live and the values, including
the low and false values which our existing social, psychological
and economic patterns tend to impose.

do, that our economic and social systems are impervious tochange.

11

i

Certainly we have no right to abandon the task of modifying the

I

'\

1

1,

I do not believe, as many

system to serve human need, when we have hardly begun to develop
I,
1:

the sciences that could apply that we have already learned about
how human beings acquire values and structure their personal and
social goals.

These are the practical arts that can help the re

covery of morale and social vision.
Certainly a meaningful life-style is not reached by immers
ing ourselves in drugs, devoting our lives to the acquisition of
more material wealth than we actually need, nursing the racial
and ethnic prejudices that fragment human life, retreating be
hind locked doors while our cities decay and our culture degen
erates, or waiting for the bomb to fall or revolutionaries to
strike.

These are the ways to ruin.

Even if our civilization should escape destruction, millions
of people, by surrendering themselves to moral drift and pur
poseless existences, would see their lives withered and their
hopes voided.

None of this need be.

Enough is known already

about the requirements for human strength and growth for us to
construct an applied science of Life Values Education and guid
ance.

The present crisis is ecology, economy, race relations,

and national goals should teach us that the victories and
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accomplishments of the next half-century must be radically dif
ferent from the last; they must be accomplishments of the human
spirit, fired by a passionate attachment to the future of our one
human race here on earth.
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THE TEACHER FACES A DILEMMA:
A MORAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR STUDENTS
by
William E. Collie and Ruth B. Schumacher
Wrioht State University, Dayton, Ohio

I

(Original Article - 1979)

I

Moral dilemmas with which students can readily identify have been
widely used to facilitate moral development.

These dilemmas typ

ically cast students in the central character role and present
them with real conflicts that raise moral questions.

Rarely, if

ever, however, do dilemmas portray teachers facing moral issues.
This latter type of dilemma is also appropriate as an educa
tional strategy and serves additional purposes that the student
focused dilemma cannot.
Casting teachers as central characters can help students:
(1)

recognize that teachers, as well as students, face
problems in decision-making;

(2)

understand that resolving inter-personal concerns
are part of the teaching p r ocess;

(3)

realize that fulfilling occupational/vocational
roles involve moral decision-making; and

(4)

realize that moral growth is a developmental, lifelong process.

To facilitate student identification with this type of dilemma,
the issue(s) should be student-oriented (e.g. breaking rules,
cheating).

An example of a student-oriented dilemma that por

trays the teacher as the decision-maker follows.
Mrs. Kane teaches a senior course in which she utilizes small
groups and group assignments.

At the final, two students in

group four separately told Mrs. Kane that the group had written
Jake's name on the last group assignment at his insistence but
that he actuall y had not contributed any work at all to the as
signment.

The two remaining members of the group (other than

Jake) had left the room p rior to the statements of the two stu
dents.

Jake had taken the final prior to finals week in order to

participate in an out-of-town speech tournament.
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Final semester

grades are due before Jake will return to town.
Mrs. Kane knows she can give Jake an incomplete and contact him
when he returns to school the following week to discuss the in
cident.

She feels that giving him an incomplete, however, would

indicate her acceptance of the statements of the two students
with whom she talked, since her records show no incomplete work
for Jake.

On the other hand, if the accusation is true, Mrs.

Kane has sympathy for Jake's group because she feels that only
those students who actually do the group work should receive
credit.
Should Mrs. Kane include the last group assignment grade in com
puting Jake's semester grade?
If additional information is needed to heighten the dilemma, the
teacher may choose among the following complicating factors:
1.

The group assignment counts 30% of the semester
grade.
If Jake receives a zero for the group
assignment, he will fail the course.

2.

Mrs. Kane knows that Jake, a last semester senior,
must pass this course if he is to have enough credits
to graduate.

3.

On all other assignments Jake has done his work and
has given no reason for Mrs. Kane to question his
ability or his willingness to do the work.

4.

Mrs. Kane knows that the two students who have
reported that Jake did not do the assigned work
also are in Jake's speech class. Unlike Jake,
they were not chosen to participate in the speech
tournament.

5.

On an earlier class assignment, Jake copied material
without giving proper credit for the source.

6.

Even if the matter were settled later in Jake's
favor, issuance now of an incomplete for Jake's
grade would mean that his name would not appear
in the graduation program because of printing
deadlines.
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THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION
by
Lawrence Kohlberg
(Reprinted by permission, Phi Delta
pp. 670-677.)

Kappan, June 1975,

In this article, I present an overview of the cognitive-develop
mental approach to moral education and its research foundations,

compare it with other approaches, and report the experimental wor l
my colleagues and I are doing to apply the approach.
1.

Moral Stages

The cognitive-developmental approach was fully stated for
the first time by John Dewey.

The approach is called cognitive

because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual ed
ucation, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the
child about moral issues and decisions.

It is called develop

mental because it sees the aims of moral education as movement
through moral stages.

According to Dewey:

The aim of education is growth or development, both intel
lectual and moral.
Ethical and psychological principles can
aid the school in the greatest of all constructions-the building of
-'l free and powerful character.
Only knowledge of the order and con
nection of the stages in psychological development can insure this.

Education is the work of supplying the conditions which enable the
psychological functions to mature in the freest and fullest
manner.l
Dewey postulated three levels of moral development:

1)

the pre-moral or preconventional level "of behavior motivated by bio
logical and social impulses with results for morals,"
ventional level of behavior

2) the con

"in which the individual accepts with

little critical reflection the standards of his group," and

3)

the autonomous level of behavior in which "conduct is guided by the
individual thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is
good, and does not accept the standard of his group without

54

reflection."*
Dewey's thinking about moral stages was theoretical.

Build

ing upon his prior studies of cognitive stages, Jean Piaget made
the first effort to define stages of moral reasoning in children
through actual interviews and through observations of children
2
(in games with rules) .
Using this interview material, Piaget
def i ned the pre-moral, the conventional, and the autonomous levels
as follows:

1) the pre-moral stage, where there was no sense of ob-

l igation to rules;

2) the heteronomous stage, where the right was

literal obedience to rules and an equation of obligation with
submission to power and punishment (roughly ages 4-8); and

3) the

autonomous stage, where the purpose and consequences of following

rules are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and
exchange (roughly ages 8-12) .**
In 1955 I started to redefine and validate (through longi
tudinal and cross-cultural study) the Dewey-Piaget levels and
stages.

The resulting stages are presented in Table 1.

We claim to have validated the stages defined in Table 1.
The notion that stages can be validated

by longitudinal study im
3
The
p lies that stages have definit empirical characteristics.

concept of stages (as used by Piaget and myself) implies the fol
l o wing characteristics:
1.

Stages are "structured wholes," or organized systems

o f thought.
2.

Individuals are consistent in level of moral judgment.

Stages form an invariant sequence.

Under all conditions

except extreme trauma, movement is always forward, never backward.
Individuals never skip stages; movement is always to the next
s t age up.
3.

Stages are "hierarchical integrations."

Thinking at a

higher stage includes or comprehends within it lower-stage thinking.
*These levels correspond roughly to our three major levels:
the preconventional, the conventional, and the principles.
Simi
lar levels were propounded by William McDougall, Leonard Hobhouse,
and James Mark Baldwin.
**Piaget's stages correspond to our first three stages:
S t age O (pre-moral), Stage 1 (heteronomous), and Stage 2 ( instru
mental reciprocity).
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There is a tendency to function at or prefer the highest stage
available.
Each of these characteristics has been demonstrated for
moral stages.

Stages are defined by responses to a set of verbal

moral dilemmas classified according to an elaborate scoring
scheme.

Validating studies include:

1.

A 20-year study of 50 Chicago-area boys, middle- and

working-class.

Initially interviewed at ages 10-16, they have

been reinterviewed at three-year intervals thereafter.
2.

A small, six-year longitudinal study of Turkish village

and city boys of the same age.
3.

A variety of other cross-sectional studies in Canada,

Britain, Israel, Taiwan, Yucatan, Honduras, and India.
With regard to the structured whole or consistency criterion,
we have found that more than 50% of an individual's thinking is
always at one stage, with the remainder at the next adjacent stage
(which he is leaving or which he is moving into).
With regard to invariant sequence, our longitudinal results
have been presented in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry (see foot
note 8), and indicate that on every retest individuals were either
at the same stage as three years earlier or had moved up.

This

was true in Turkey as well as in the United States.
With regard to the hierarchical integration criterion, it
has been demonstrated that adolescents exposed to written state
ments at each of the six stages comprehend or correctly put in
their own words all statements at or below their own stage but
fail to comprehend any statements more than one stage above their
own.

4

Some individuals comprehend the next stage above their

own; some do not.

Adolescents prefer (or rank as best) the high

est stage they can comprehend.
Table 1.
1.

Definition of Moral Stages

Preconventional level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and
labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels
either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences
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of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of
the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels.
The level is divided into the following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regard
less of the human meaning or value of these consequence. Avoid
ance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power arevalued
intheir own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral
order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being
stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action
consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs
and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed
in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of
reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always
interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter
of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty,
gratitude, or justice.
II.

Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individ
ual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its
own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The
attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations
and social order, and of identifying with the persons or group in
volved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good-bo']--nice girl"
orientation.
Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others
and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypi
cal images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior
is frequently judged by intention- "he means well" becomes im
portant for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4:
The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social
order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing re
spect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for
its own sake.
III.

Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral
values and principles that have validity and application apart
from the authority of the groups or persons holding these princi
ples and apart from the individual's own identification with these
groups. This level also has two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in
terms of general individual rights and standards which have been
critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There
is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and
opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for
teaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal
"values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the
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"legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility
of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social
utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law andorder •
Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the bind
ing element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the
American government and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, univer
sality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethi
cal (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not
concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these
are universal principles of justi c e, of the reciprocity and equality o f
human ri ghts, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as in
dividual persons ("From is to Ought," pp. 164-165).
-Reprinted from

The Jour nal of Philo sophy, October 25, 1973.

To understand moral stages, it is important to clarify their
relations to stage of logic or intelligence, on the one hand, and
to moral behavior on the other.

Maturity of moral judgment is

not highly correlated with IQ or verbal intelligence (correlations
are only in the 30's, accounting for 10% of the variance).

Cog

nitive development in the stage sense, however, is more important
for moral development than such correlations suggest.

Piaget has

found that after the child learns to speak there are three major
stages of reasoning:

the intuitive, the concrete operational, and

the formal operational.

At around age 7, the child enters the

stage of concrete logical thought:

He can make logical inferences,

classify, and handle quantitative relations about concrete things.
In adolescence individuals usually enter the stage of formal oper
ations.

At this stage they can reason abstractly, i.e., consider

all possibilities, form hypotheses, deduce implications from hypotheses, and test them against reality.

*

Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning: a person's
*Many adolescents and adults only partially attain the stage
of formal operations. They do consider all the actual relations
of one thing to another at the same time, but they do not con
sider all possibilities and form abstract hypotheses.
A few do
not advance this far, remaining "concrete operational."
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logical

stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral stage he can

attain.

A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational

is limited to the preconventional moral stages (Stages 1 and 2).
A person whose logical stage is only partially formal operational
is limited to the conventional moral stages (Stages 3 and 4).
While logical development is necessary for moral development and
sets limits to it, most individuals are higher in logical stage
than they are in moral stage.

As an example, over 50% of late

adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but
only 10% of these adults (all formal operational) display prin
cipled (Stages 5 and 6) moral reasoning.
The moral stages are structures of moral judgment or moral reason
ing.

Structures of moral judgment must be distinguished from the

contentof moral judgment.

As an example, we cite responses to a

dilemma used in our various studies to identify moral stage.

The

dilemma raises the issue of stealing a drug to save a dying woman.
The inventor of the drug is selling it for 10 times what it costs
him to make it.

The woman's husband cannot raise the money, and

the seller refuses to lower the price or wait for payment.

What

should the husband do?
The choice endorsed by a subject (steal, don't steal) is
called the content of his moral judgment in the situation.

His rea

soning about the choice defines the structure of his moral judg
ment.

This reasoning centers on the following 10 universal moral

values or issues of concern to persons in these moral dilemmas:
1. Punishment

6. Life

2. Property

7. Liberty

3. Roles and concerns
of affection

8. Distributive justice

4. Roles and concerns

of authority

9. Truth

10. Sex

5. Law

A moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of
these values as they conflict in concrete situations of choice.
The stage or structure of a person's moral judgment defines:
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1)

whathe finds valuable in each of these moral issues

law), i.e., how he defines the value, and

(life,

2) why he finds it val

uable, i.e., the reasons he gives for valuing it.

As an example,

at Stage 1 life is valued in terms of the power or possessions of
the person involved; at Stage 2, for its usefulness in satisfying
the needs of the individual in question or others; at Stage 3, in
terms of the individual's relations with others and their valua
tiontion of him; at Stage 4, in terms of social or religious law.
Only at Stages 5 and 6 is each life seen as inherently worthwhile,
aside from other considerations.
Moral Judgment Vs. Moral Action
Having clarified the nature of stages of moraljudgment,we
must consider the relation of moral judgment to moralaction.

If

logical reasoning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
mature moral judgment, mature moral judgment is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for mature moral action.

One cannot

follow moral principles if one does not understand (or believe
in) moral principles.
ciples.

However, one can reason in terms of prin

As an example, Richard Krebs and I found that only 15%

of students showing some principled thinking cheated as compared
to 55% of conventional subjects and 70% of preconventional sub
jects.5

Nevertheless, 15% of the principled subjects did cheat,

suggesting that factors additional to moral judgment are neces
sary for principled moral reasoning to be translated into "moral
action."
pressures.

Partly, these factors include the situation and it
Partly, what happens depends upon the individual's

motives and emotions.

Partly, what the individual does depends

upon a general sense of will, purpose or "ego strength."

As an

example of the role of will or ego strength in moral behavior, we
may cite the study by Krebs:
ventional subjects cheated.
a measure of attention/will.

Slightly more than half of his con
These subjects were also divided by
Only 26% of the ''strong-willed"

conventional subjects cheated; however, 74% of the "weak-willed"
subjects cheated.
If maturity of moral reasoning is only one factor in moral
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behavior, why does the cognitive-developmental approach to moral
education focus so heavily upon moral reasoning?

For the follow

ing reasons:
1. Moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behavior,
is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered
in moral behavior.
2. While other factors influence moral behavior, moral judg
ment is the only distinctively moralfactor in moral behavior.

To

illustrate, we noted that the Krebs study indicated that "strong
willed" conventional stage subjects resisted cheating more than
"weak-willed" subjects.

For those at a preconventional level of

moral reasoning, however, "will" had an opposite effect.

"Strong

willed" Stages 1 and 2 subjects cheated more, not less, than
"weak-willed" subjects, i.e., they had the "courage of their
(amoral) convictions" that it was worthwhile to cheat.

"Will,"

then, is an important factor in moral behavior, but it is not
distinctively moral; it becomes moral only when informed by mature
moral judgment.
3. Moral judgment change is long-range or irreversible; a
higher stage is never lost.

Moral behavior as such is largely

situational and reversible or "loseable" in new situations.
II.

Aims of Moral and Civic Education

Moral psychology describes what moral development is, as
studied empirically.

Moral education must also consider moral

philosophy, which strives to tell us what moral development
ideally ought to be.

Psychology finds an invariant sequence of

moral stages; moral philosophy must be invoked to answer whether
a later stage is a better stage.

The "stage" of senescence and

death follows the ''stage" of aulthood, but that does not mean
that senescence and death are better.

Our claim that the latest

or principled stages of moral reasoning are morally better stages,
then, must rest on considerations of moral philosophy.
The tradition of moral philosophy to which we appeal is the
liberal or rational tradition, in particular the "formalistic"
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or "deontological" tradition running from Immanuel Kant to John
Rawls. 6 Central to this tradition is the claim that an adequate
morality is principl2d, i.e., that it makes judgments in terms of
universal principles applicable to all mankind.

Principles are to be

distinguished from rules, primarily "thou shalt nots" such as are
represented by the Ten Commandments, prescriptions of kinds of
actions.

Principles are, rather, universal guides to making a

moral decision.

An example is Kant's "categorical imperative,"

formulated in two ways.

The first is the maxim of respect for

human personality, "Act always toward the other as an end, not
as a means."

The second is the maxim of universalization, "Choose

only as you would be willing to have everyone choose in your situ
ation."

Principles like that of Kant's state the formal condiIn the dilemma in which a

tions of a moral choice or action.

woman is dying because a druggist refuses to release his drug for
less than the stated price, the druggist is not acting morally,
though he is not violating the ordinary moral rules (he is not
actually stealing or murdering).

But he is violating principles:

He is treating the woman simply as a means to his ends of profit,
and he is not choosing as he would wish anyone to choose (if the
druggist were in the dying woman's place, he would not want a
druggist to choose as he is choosing).

Under most circumstances,

choice in terms of conventional moral rules and choice in terms
of principles coincide.

Ordinarily principles dictate not steal

ing (avoiding stealing is implied by acting in terms of a regard
for others as ends and in terms of what one would want everyone
to do).

In a situation where stealing is the only means to save

a life, however, principles contradict the ordinary rules and
would dictate stealing.

Unlike rules which are supported by

social authority, principles are freely chosen by the individual
because of their intrinsic moral validity.*
The conception that a moral choice is a choice made in
terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral
*Not~ll freely chosen values or rules are principles, how
ever, Hitler chose the "rule," exterminate the enemies of the Aryan
race," but such a rule is not a universalizable principle.
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philosophy that moral principles are ultimately principles of
justice.

In essence, moral conflicts are conflicts between the

claims of persons, and principles for resolving these claims are
principles of justice, "for giving each his due."

Central to jus

tice are the demands of liberty, equality, and reciprocity.
moral stage, there is a concern for justice.

At every

The most damning

statement a school child can make about a teacher is that "he's
not fair."

At each higher stage, however, the conception of

justice is reorganized.

At Stage 1, justice is punishing the bad

in terms of "an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth."

At

Stage 2, it is exchanging favors and goods in an equal manner.

At

Stages 3 and 4, it is treating people as they desire in terms of
the conventional rules.

At Stage S, it is recognized that all

rules and laws flow from justice, from a social contract between
the governors and the governed designed to protect the equal
rights of all.

At Stage 6, personally chosen moral principles

are also principles of justice, the principles any member of a
society would choose for that society if he did not know what his
position was to be in the society and in which he might be the
7
least advantaged.
Principles chosen from this point of view are,
first, the maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of
others and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which
are not to the benefit of all, including the least advantaged.
As an example of stage progression in the orientation to
8
justice, we may take judgments about capital punishment.
Capi
tal punishment is only firmly rejected at the two principled
stages, when the notion of justice as vengeance or retribution is
abandoned.

At the sixth stage, capital punishment is not condoned

even if it may have some useful deterrent effect in promoting law
and order.

This is because it is not a punishment we would

choose for a society if we assumed we had as much chance of being
born into the position of a criminal or murderer as being born
into the position of a law abider.
We are decisions based on universal principles of justice
better decisions?
men could agree.

Because they are decisions on which all moral
When decisions are based on conventional moral
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rules, men will disagree, since they adhere to conflicting systems
of rules dependent on culture and social position.

Throughout

history men have killed one another in the name of conflicting
moral rules and values, most recently in Vietnam and the Middle
East.

Truly morla or just resolutions of conflicts require prin

ciples which are, or can be, universalizable.
Alternative Approaches
We have given a philosophic rationale for stage advance as
the aim of moral education.

Given this rationale, the develop

mental approach to moral education can avoid the problems in
herent in the other two major approaches to moral education.

The

first alternative approach is that of indoctrinative moral edu
cation, the preaching and imposition of the rules and values of
the teacher and his culture on the child.

In America, when this

indoctrinative approach has been developed in a systematic manner,
it has usually been termed "character education."
Moral values, in the character education approach, are
preached or taught in terms of what may be called the "bag of vir
tues."

In the classic studies of character by Hugh Hartshorne and

Mark May, the virtues chosen were honesty, service, and self
control.9

It is easy to get superficial consensus on such a bag

of virtues-until one examines in detail the list of virtues in
volved and the details of their definition.

Is the Hartshorne

and May bag more adequate than the Boy Scout bag (a Scout should
be honest, loyal, reverent, clean, brave, etc.)?

When one turns

to the details of defining each virtue, one finds equal uncer
tainty or difficulty in reaching consensus.
one should not steal to save a life?

Does honesty mean

Does it mean that a student

should not help another student with his homework?
Character education and other forms of indoctrinative moral
education have aimed at teaching universal values (it is assumed
that honesty or service are desirable traits for all men in all
societies), but the detailed definitions used are relative;
they are defined by the opinions of the teacher and the conven
tional culture and rest on the authority of the teacher for their
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justification.

In this sense character education is close to the

unreflective valuings by teachers which constitute the hidden cur
riculum of the school.*

Because of the current unpopularity of

indoctrinative approaches to moral education, a family of ap
proaches called "values clarification" has become appealing to
teachers.

Values clarification takes the first step implied by a

rational approach to moral education:

the eliciting of thechild's

own judgment or opinion about issues or situations in which values
conflict, rather than imposing the teacher's opinion on him.
Values clarification, however, does not attempt to go further
than eliciting awareness of values' it is assumed that becoming
more self-aware about one's values is an end in itself.

Funda

mentally, the definition of the end of values education as self
awareness derives from a belief in ethical relativity held by
many value-clarifiers.

As stated by Peter Engel, "One must con

trast value clarification and value inculcation.

Value clarifi

cation implies the principle that in the consideration of values
there is no single correct answer."

Within these premises of

"no correct answer," children are to discuss moral dilemmas in
such a way as to reveal different values and discuss their value
differences with each other.

The teacher is to stress that "our

values are different," not that one value is more adquate than
others.

If this program is systematically followed, students will

themselves become relativists, elieving there is no "right" moral
answer.

For instance, a student caught cheating might argue that

he did nothing wrong, since his own hierarchy of values, which
may be different from that of the teacher, made it right for him
to cheat.
Like values clarification, the cognitive developmental ap
proach to moral education stresses open or Socratic peer dis
cussion of value dilemmas.

Such discussion, however, has an aim:

*As an example of the "hidden curriculum," we may cite a
second-grade classroom. My son came home from this classroom one
day saying he did not want to be "one of the bad boys." Asked
"Who are the bad boys?" he replied, "The ones who don't put their
books back and get yelled at."
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stimulation of movement to the next stage of moral reasoning.
Like values clarification, the developmental approach opposes
indoctrination.

Stimulation of movement to the next stage of

reasoning is not indoctrinative, for the following reasons:
1. Change is in the way of reasoning rather than in the
particular beliefs involved.
2. Students in a class are at different stages; the aim is
to aid movement of each to the next stage, not convergence on a
common patterns.
3. The teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked
as authoritative.

It enters in only as one of many opinions,

hopefully one of those at a next higher stage.
4. The notion that some judgments are more adequate than
others is communicated.

Fundamentally, however, this means that

the student is encouraged to articulate a position which seems
most adequate to him and to judge the adequacy of the reasoning
of others.
In addition to having more definite aims than values
clarification, the moral development approach restricts value ed
ucation to that which is moral or, more specifically, to justice.
This is for two reasons.

First, it is not clear that the whole

realm of personal, political, and religious values is a realm
which is nonrelative, i.e., in which there are universals and a
direction of development.

Second, it is not clear that the pub

lic school has a right or mandate to develop values in general.*
In our view, value education in the public schools should be re
stricted to that which the school has the right and mandate to
*Restriction of deliberate value education to the moral
may be clarified by our example of the second-grade teacher who
made tidying up of books a matter of moral indoctrination.
Tidiness is a value, but it is not a moral value. Cheating is a
moral issue, intrinsically one of fairness.
It involves issues
of violation of trust and taking advantage. Failing to tidy the
room may under certain conditions be an issue of fairness, when
it puts an undue burden on others.
If it is handled by the
teacher as a matter of cooperation among the group in this sense,
it is a legitimate focus of deliberate moral education.
If it
is not, it simply represents the arbitrary imposition of the
teacher's values on the child.
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develop:

an awareness of justice, or of the rights of others in

our Constitutional system.

While the Bill of Rights prohibits the

t eaching of religious beliefs, or of specific value systems, it
does not prohibit the teaching of the awareness of rights and
principles of justice fundamental to the Constitution itself.
When moral education is recognized as centered in justice
and differentiated from value education or affective education,
i t becomes apparent that moral and civic education are much the
same thing.

This equation, taken for granted by the classic phil

osophers of education from Plato and Aristotle to Dewey, is basic
t o our claim that a concern for moral education is central to the
educational objectives of social studies.
The term

civic education is used to refer to social studies

as more than the study of the facts and concepts of social sci
ence, history, and civics.

It is education for the analytic un

derstanding, value principles, and motivation necessary for a
citizen in a democracy if democracy is to be an effective pro
cess.

It is political education.

Civic or political education

means the stimulation of development of more advanced patterns of
reasoning about political and social decisions and their imple
mentation in action.
soning.

These patterns are patterns of moral rea

Our studies show that reasoning and decision-making

about political decisions are directly derivative of broader pat
terns of moral reasoning and decision making.

We have interviewed

high school and college students about concrete political situa
tions involving laws to govern open housing, civil disobedience
for peace in Vietnam, free press rights ot publish what might
disturb national order, and distribution of income through taxa
tion.

We find that reasoning on these political decisions can be

classified according to moral stage and that an individual's
stage on political dilemmas is at the same level as on nonpoliti
cal moral dilemmas (euthanasia, violating authority to maintain
trust in a family, stealing a drug to save one's dying wife).
Turning from reasoning to action, similar findings are obtained.
In 1963 a study was made of those who sat in at the University of
California, Berkeley, administration building and those who did
not in the Free Speech Movement crisis.
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Of those at Stage 6, 80%
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sat in, believing that principles of free speech were being com
promised, and that all efforts to compromise and negotiate with
the administration had failed.
ventional (Stage 3 or Stage 4)

In contrast, only 15% of the consubjects sat in.

(Stage 5 subjects

were in between.)*
From a psychological side, then, political development is
part of moral development.
side.

The same is true from the philosophic

In the Republic , Plato sees political education as part of

a broader education for moral justice and finds a rationale for
such education in terms of universal philosophic principles rat he r
than the demands of a particular society.

More recentl y , Dewe y

claims the same .
In historical perspective, America was the first nation
whose government was publicly founded on post-conventional prin
ciples of justice, rather than upon the authority central to con
ventional moral reasoning.

At the time of our founding, post

conventional or principled moral and political reasoning was the
possession of the minorit y , as it still is.

Today, as in the time

of our founding, the majority of our adults are at the conventiona l
level, particularly the "law and order"

(fourth) moral stage.

(Svery few years the Gallup Poll circulates the Bill of Rights
unidentified, and every y ear it is turned down.)

The Founding

Fathers intuitively understood this without benefit of our elab
orate social science research; the y constructed a document design
ing a government which would maintain principles of justice and
the rights of man even though principled men were not the men in
power.

The machinery included checks and balances, the indepen

dent judiciar y , and freedom of the press.
machinery found its use at Watergate.

Most recently, this

The tragedy of Richard

Nixon, as Harry Truman said long ago, was that he never understood
*The differential action of the principled subjects was de
termined by two things:
First, they were more likely to judge it
right to violate authority by sitting in. But second, they were
also in general more consistent in engaging in political action
according to their judgment. Ninety percent of all Stage 6 sub
jects thought it right to sit in, and all 90 % lived up to this
belief. Among the Stage 4 subjects, 45 % thought it right to sit
in, but only 33 % lived up to this belief by acting.
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the Constitution (a Stage 5 document), but the Constitution
understood Richard Nixon. *
Watergate, then, is not some sign of moral decay of the

1-

nation, but rather of the fact that understanding and action in
s upport of justice principles are still the possession of a
minority of our society.

Insofar as there is moral decay, it

represents the weakening of conventional morality in the face of
s ocial and value conflict today.

This can lead the less fortunate

adolescent to fixation at the preconventional level, the more

r

f ortunate to movement to principles.

We find a larger propor

tion of youths at the principled level today than was the case in
t heir fathers' day, but also a larger proportion at the precon
ve ntional level.
Given this state, moral and civic education in the schools
becomes a more urgent task.

In the high school today, one often

hears both preconventional adolescents and those beginning to
move beyond convention sounding the same note of disaffection for
t he school

While our political institutions are in principle

Stage 5 (i.e., vehicles for maintaining universal rights through
the democratic process), our schools have traditionally been
Stage 4 institutions of convention and authority.

Today more

than ever, democratic schools systematically engaged in civic edu
c ation are required.
Our approach to moral and civic education relates the study
of law - and government to the actual creation of a democratic
school in which moral dilemmas are discussed and resolved in a
manner which will stimulate moral development.
Planned Moral Education
For many years, moral development was held by psychologists
to be primarily a result of family upbringing and family conditions.

In particular, conditions of affection and authority in

*No public or private word or deed of Nixon ever rose above
Stage 4, the "law and order" stage. His last comments in the
White House were of wonderment that the Republican Congress could
turn on him after so many Stage 2 exchanges of favors in getting
them elected.
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the home were believed to be critical, some balance of warmth
and firmness being optional for moral development.

This view

arises if morality is conceived as an internalization of the ar
bitrary rules of parents and culture, since such acceptance must
be based on affection and respect for parents as authorities
rather than on the rational nature of the rules involved.
Studies of family correlates of moral stage development
do not support this internalization view of the conditions for
moral development.

Instead, they suggest that the conditions

for moral development in homes and schools are similar and that
the conditions are consistent with cognitive-developmental theory.
In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is a natural pro
duct of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role taking,
toward putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings.
It is also a product of a universal human concern for justice,
for reciprocity or equality in the relation of one person to an
other.

As an example, when my son was 4, he became a morally

principled vegetarian and refused to eat meat, resisting all
parental persuasion to increase his protein intake.
was "It's bad to kill animals."

His reason

His moral commitment to vege

tarianism was not taught or acquired from parental authority:

it

was the result of the universal tendency of the young self to
project its consciousness and values into other living things,
other selves.

My son's vegetarianism also involved a sense of

justice, revealed when I read him a book about Eskomos in which a
rea! hunting expedition was described.

His response was to say,

"Daddy, there is one kind of meat I would eat - Eskimo meat.
It's all right to eat Eskimos because they eat animals."

This

natural sense of justice or reciprocity was Stage 1 - an eye-for
an-eye, a tooth-for-a-tooth.

My son's sense of the value of

life was also Stage 1 and involved no differentiation between
human personality and physical life.
1, was, however, natural and internal.

His morality, though Stage
Moral development past

Stage 1, then, is not an internalization but the reconstruction
of role taking and conceptions of justice toward greater adequacy.
These reconstructions occur in order to achieve a better match
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between the child's own moral structures and the structures of
the social and moral situations he confronts.
conditions of match into two kinds:

We divide these

those dealing with moral

discussions and communication and those dealing with the total
moral environment or atmosphere in which the child lives.
In terms of moral discussion, the important conditions
appear to be:

1. Exposure to the next higher stage of reasoning
2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradic
tions for the child's current moral structure, leading to dis
satisfaction with his current level
3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue combining the
first two conditions, in which conflicting moral views are com
pared in an open manner.
Studies of families in India and America suggest that mor
ally advanced children have parents at higher stages.

Parents

expose children to the next higher stage, raising moral issues
.
.
'
h ange a b out sue h issues.
·
lO
an d engaging
in
open d.1a 1 ague or 1nter-c

Drawing on this notion of the discussion conditions stimu
lating advance, Moshe Blatt conducted classroom discussions of
conflict-laden hypothetical moral dilemmas with four classes of
junior high and high school students for a semester. 11

In each

of these classes, students were to be found at three stages.
Since the children were not all responding at the same stage,
the ar~uments they used with each other were at different levels.
In the course of these discussions among the students, the teacher
first supported and clarified those arguments that were one
stage above the lowest stage among the children; for example, the
teacher supported Stage 3 rather than Stage 2.

When it seemed

that these arguments were understood by the students, the teacher
then challenged that stage, using new situations, and clarified
the arguments one stage above the previous one:
than Stage 3.

Stage 4 rather

At the end of the semester, all the students were

retested; they showed significant upward change when compared to
the controls, and they maintained the change one year later.

In

the experimental classrooms, from one-fourth to one-half of the
71

students moved up a stage, while there was essentially no change
during the course of the experiment in the control group.
Given the Blatt studies showing that moral discussion could
raise moral stage, we undertook the next step:

to see if teachers

could conduct moral discussions in the course of teaching high
school social studies with the same results.

This step we took

in cooperation with Edwin Fenton, who introduced moral dilemmas
in his nith-and eleventh-grade social studies texts.

Twenty-four

teachers in the Boston and Pittsburgh areas were given some in
struction in conducting moral discussions around the dilemmas in
the text.

About half of the teachers stimulated significant de

velopmental change in their classroom - upward stage movement of
one-quarter to one-half a stage.

In control classes using the

text but no moral dilemma discussions, the same teachers failed
to stimulate any moral change in the students.

Moral discussion,

then, can be a usable and effective part of the curriculum at
grade level.

Working with filmstrip dilemmas produced in coop

eration with Guidance Associates, second-grade teachers conducted
moral discussions yielding a similar amount of moral stage move
ment.
Moral discussion and curriculum, however, constitute only
one portion of the conditions stimulating moral growth.

When we

turn to analyzing the broader life environment, we turn to a con
sideration of the moral atmosphere of the home, the school, and
the broader society.

The first basic dimension of social atmos

phere is the role-taking opportunities it provides, the extent
to which it encourages the child to take the point of view of
others.

Role taking is related to the amount of social inter

action and social communication in which the child engages, as
well as to his sense of efficacy in influencing attitudes of
others.

The second dimension of social atmosphere, more strictly

moral, is the level of justice of the environment or institution.
The justice structure of an institution refers to the perceived
rules or principles for distributing rewards, punishments, re
sponsibilities, and privileges among institutional members.

This

structure may exist or be perceived at any of our moral stages.
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As an example, a study of a traditional prison revealed that in
12
mates perceived it as Stage 1, regardless of their own levei.
Obedience to arbitrary command by power figures and punishment
for disobedience were seen as the governing justice norms of the
prison.

A behavior-modification prison using point rewards for

conformity was perceived as a Stage 2 system of instrumental ex
change.

Inmates at Stage 3 or 4 perceived this institution as

more fair than the traditional prison, but not as fair in their
own terms.
These and other studies suggest that a higher level of in
stitutional justice is a condition for individual development of
a higher sense of justice.

Working on these premises, Joseph

Hickey, Peter Scharf, and I worked with guards and inmates in a
13
A social con

women's prison to create a more just community.

tract was set up in which guards and inmates each had a vote of
one and in which rules were made and conflicts resolved through
discussions of fairness and a democratic vote in a communitymeet
ing.

The program has been operating four years and has stimu

lated moral stage advance in inmates, though it is still too
early to draw conclusions as to its overall long-range effec
tiveness for rehabilitation.
One year ago, Fenton, Ralph Mosher, and I received a grant
from the Danforth Foundation (with additional support from the
Kennedy Foundation) to make moral education a living matter in
two high schools in the Boston area (Cambridge and Brookline)
and two in Pittsburgh.

The plan was training counselors and

social studies and English teachers in conducting moral dis
cussions and making moral discussion an integral part of the cur
riculum.

The second was establishing a just community school

within a public high school.
We have stated the theory of the just community high school,
postulating that discussing real-life moral situations and ac
tions as issues of fairness and as matters for democratic deci
sion would stimulate advance in both moral reasoning and moral
action.

A participatory democracy provides more extensive oppor

tunities for role taking and a higher level of perceived
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institutional justice than does any other social arrangement.
Most alternative schools strive to establish a democratic gov
ernance, but none we have observed has achieved a vital or viable
participatory democracy.

Our theory suggested reasons why we

might succeed where others failed.

First, we felt that democracy

had to be a central commitment of a school, rather than a humani
tarian frill.
ment.

Democracy as moral education provides that commit

Second, democracy in alternative schools often fails be

cause it bores the students.

Students prefer to let teachers

make decisions about staff, courses, and schedules, rather than
to attend lengthy, complicated meetings.

Our theory said that

the issues a democracy should focus on are issues of morality and
fairness.

Real issues concerning drugs, stealing, disruptions,

and grading are never boring if handled as issues of fairness.
Third, our theory told us that if large democratic community meet
ings were preceded by small-group moral discussion, higher-stage
thinking by students would win out in later decisions, avoiding
the disasters of mob rule. *
Currently, we can report that the school based on our theor y
makes democracy work or function where other schools have failed.
It is too early to make any claims for its effectiveness in caus
ing moral development, however.
Our Cambridge just community school within the public high
school was started after a small summer planning session of vol
unteer teachers, students, and parents.

At the time the school

opened in the fall, only a commitment to democracy and a skele
ton program of English and Social Studies had been decided on.
The school started with six teachers from the regular school and
60 students, 20 from academic professional homes and 20 from
*An example of the need for small-group discussion comes
from an alternative school community meeting called because a
pair of the students had stolen the school's video-recorder. The
resulting majority decision was that the school should buy back
the recorder from the culprits through a fence. The teachers
could not accept this decision and returned to a more authorita
tive approach.
I believe if the moral reasoning of students urg
ing this solution had been confronted by students at a higher
stage, a different decision would have emerged.
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working-class homes.

The other 20 were dropouts and trouble

makers or petty delinquents in terms of previous record.

The

usual mistakes and usual chaos of a beginning alternative school
ensued.

Within a few weeks, however, a successful democratic

community process had been established.
pressing issues:

Rules were made around

disturbances, drugs, hooking.

cipline committee or jury was formed.

A student dis

The resulting rules and

enforcement have been relatively effective and reasonable.

We do

not see reasonable rules as ends in themselves, however, but as
vehicles for moral discussion and an emerging sense of community.
This sense of community and a resulting morale are perhaps the
most immediate signs of success.

This sense of community seems

to lead to behavior change of a positive sort.

An example is a

15-year-old student who started as one of the greatest combina
tions of humor, aggression, light-fingeredness, and hyperactivity
I have ever know.

From being the principal disturber of all com

munity meetings, he has become an excellent community meeting par
ticipant and occasional chairman.

He is still more ready to en

force rules for others than to observe them himself, yet his com
mitment to the school has led to a steady decrease in exotic be
havior.

In addition, he has become more involved in classes and

projects and has begun to listen and ask questions in order to
pursue a line of interest.
We attribute such behavior change not only to peer pressure
and mo-ral discussion but to the sense of community which has
emerged from the democratic process in which angry conflicts are
resolved through fairness and community decision.

This sense of

community is reflected in statements of the students to us that
there are no cliques-that the blacks and the whites, the pro
fessors' sons and the project students, are friends.
ments are supported by observation.

These state

Such a sense of community is

needed where students in a given classroom range in reading level
fromfifth-grade to college.
Fenton, Mosher, the Cambridge and Brookline teachers, and I
are now planning a four-year curriculum in English and Social
Studies centering on moral discussion, on role taking and
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communication, and on relating the government, laws, and justice
system of the school to that of the American society and other
world societies .

This will integrate an intellectual curriculum

for a higher level of understanding of society with the experien
tial components of school democracy and moral decisions.
There is very little new in this-or in anything else we
are doing.

Dewey wanted democratic experimental schools for

moral and intellectual development 70 years ago.

Perhaps Dewey's

time has come.
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A REPLY TO KOHLBERG
by
Richards. Peters
(Reprinted by permission,

Phi Delta Kappan,

June 1975, p. 678.)

Someone said of Bernard Shaw that he was like the Venus de
Milo.

What there was of him was excellent.

needs to be said of Kohlberg.

The same, I think,

The trouble is, however, that

Kohlberg remains quite impervious to criticisms of the limitations
of his view of moral education.

He has never answered, for in

stance, a series of very constructive criticisms leveled against
him by myself and Bill Alston in the Binghampton conference of
1
1969.
It is not that the stuff he continues to ladle out is not
very good.

It is, and I have made much use of it myself.

2

It is

simply that he remains oblivious of the many other important as
pects of moral education, and there is a danger that the unwary
will think that he has told the whole story.

In a commentary of

this length, I can only list the main omissions:
1.

He suffers from the rather touching belief that a
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Kantian type of morality, represented in modern times most
notably by Hare and Rawls, is the only one. 3 He fails to grasp
that utilitarianism, in which the principle of justice is prob
lematic, is an alternative type of morality and that people such
as Winch have put forward a morality of integrity in which the
principle of universalizability is problematic. 4
can be carried forward, actually.

I think this

A morality of courage as exem

plified by train robbers, the old "virtue" of Machiavelli's Prin ce
is a defensible morality.

So also is a more romantic type of

morality such as that of D.H. Lawrence, in which trust must be
placed in "the dark God within.''

It is either sheer legislation

to say that Kohlberg's morality is the true one, or it is the
worst from of the naturalistic fallacy which argues from how "mor
ality" is ordinarily used to what morality is.
2.

He does not take "good-boy" morality seriously enough

either from a practical or from a theoretical point of view.
Practically-speaking, since few are likely to emerge beyond Kohl
berg's Stages 3 and 4, it is important that our fellow citizens
should be well bedded down at one or the other of these stages.
The policeman cannot always be present, and if I am lying in the
gutter after being robbed it is somewhat otiose to speculate at
what stage the mugger is.

My regret must surely be that he had

not at least got a conventional morality well instilled in him.
Theoretically, too, the good-boy stage is crucial; for at this
stage the child learns from the inside, as it were, what it is
to follow a rule.

Unless he has learned this well (whatever it

means!), the notion of following his own rules at the autonomous
stage is unintelligible.

Kohlberg does not appreciate, either,

that moral rules have to be learned in the face of counter
inclinations.
them.

Otherwise there would, in general, be no point to

Hence the necessity at these stages for the type of rein

forcement advocated by Skinner and others and for the modeling
processes so stressed by Bronfenbrenner in his Two Worlds of
Childhood. 5

In particular, he ignores the masterly chapter

on "The Unmaking of the American Child."

He seems sublimely una

ware, too, of the mass of evidence about other aspects of moral
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education collected by Hoffman in Mussen' s Carmichael's Manual of
Child Psychology.

3.

6

As Bill Alston stresses in his article

7

and I stress

elsewhere, Kohlberg, like Piaget, is particularly weak on the
development of the affective side of morality, of moral amotions
such as "guilt," "concern for others," "remorse," and so on.
4.

Finally, Kohlberg, in his references to ego strength,

sees the importance of will in morality, but offers no account of
the type of habit training which encourages or discourages its
growth.

8

I and others have written a great deal about these other
aspects of morality and moral learning and development, it is a
pity that Lawrence Kohlberg does not start doing some homework!
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